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LAW AS A REFLECTION OF HER/HIS-STORY:
CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL PERCEPTIONS OF, AND
POSSIBILITIES FOR, PROTECTING TRANSSEXUALS'
INTERESTS IN LEGAL DETERMINATIONS OF SEX
Jody Lynei Madeira*
SEXUALITY: LEGAL FACT OR FUNGIBLE FICTION?
This case involves the most basic of questions. When is a man a man, and
when is a woman a woman? Every schoolchild, even of tender years, is
confident he or she can tell the difference, especially if the person is
wearing no clothes. These are observations that each of us makes early in
life and, in most cases, continue to have more than a passing interest in
for the rest of our lives. It is one of the more pleasant mysteries. The
deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can a physician change
the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a per-
son's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?'
Does "sex" have an objective meaning? Is "gender" merely a social
construction or is it objectively connected to "sex"? These practical
questions remain queries the law is reluctant, or perhaps unable, to
comfortably answer. Yet they are ones that law must wrestle and best.
They are very real questions for Christie Lee Littleton, the male-to-
female postoperative transsexual plaintiff in Littleton v. Prange.! Born
Lee Cavazos, Jr., Littleton married Jonathon Mark Littleton in 1989
after undergoing sex-reassignment surgery, and lived with him until
his death in 1996, when Littleton filed a malpractice suit under a
wrongful death statute as the surviving spouse. The defendant doctor
filed for summary judgment, claiming that Littleton was a man and
could not be the surviving spouse of another man. The trial court
granted the motion and the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, stating:
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Ph.D. Candidate,
Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania; M.S., 1999 Georgetown
University; B.A., B.S., 1997, Millersville University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank
Professors Larry Catfi Backer and Francis J. Mootz for their priceless advice and edit-
orial assistance. I must also recognize Lawrence and Patricia Burkett, Ronald and Carolyn
Madeira, and especially my husband Matthew for their endless love, support, and mentorship.
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 223-24 (Tex. App. 1999).
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There are some things we cannot will into being. Theyjust are .... We
hold, as a matter of law, that Christie Littleton is a male. As a male,
Christie cannot be married to another male. Her marriage to Jonathon
was invalid, and she cannot bring a cause of action as his surviving
3
spouse.
When pronouncing judgment on transsexual litigants, the courts
have not spoken from one firm perspective but instead have issued a
collection of disparate statements, a conflicting body of opinions hy-
dra-like in its complexity. These pronouncements can be grouped
into two categories. One includes judgments based on notions that
sex has a fixed, easily determined and objective meaning grounded in
biology.4 The other includes judgments based on the idea that sex is
personal to its possessor and must be determined from the perspec-
tive of the individual affected . Ironically, the only certainty today is
uncertainty regarding what roles sex and sexual identity should play
in the legal realm and what constitutional rights should accrue to in-
dividuals as a result of their sex and sexual identity.
By focusing on transsexualism to analyze the jurisprudential
treatment of sex and sexual identity, we can gain insight into broader
issues relating to how the law characterizes sex and sexual identity."
Of course, "sexuality in law is tied to the legal determination of sex, a
determination that proves to be influenced by capacity and desire for
heterosexual intercourse, and by the future considerations of the sub-
"3 Id. at 231.
4 See Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d
748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen, 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977);James v. Ranch
Mart Hardware, 1994 WL 731517, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993); B. v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1974);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 449 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1971); Anonymous v. Weiner,
270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970);
In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Misc. 1987); K v. Health Div., 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977);
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. App. 1999); Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (P. 1970).
5 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. McConn,
489 F. Supp. 76 (D. Tex. 1980); Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975); Chicago v.
Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522 (11. 1978); In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001);
Doe ex rel Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060-A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11,
2000), affd, Doe v. Brockton School Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399, at *1 (Mass.
App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000); M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Maffei v.
Kolaeton Indus., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1995); Richards v. United States Tennis
Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1977); Hartin v. Dir. of Bureau of Records and Statis-
tics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1973); In reAnonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1968).
6 See Andrew N. Sharpe, Institutionalizing Heterosexuality: The Legal Exclusion of 'Impossible'
(Trans)sexualities, in LECAL QUEERIES: LESBIAN, GAY, AND TRANSGENDER LEGAL STUDIES 31 (Les-
lieJ. Moran et al. eds., 1998) ("Legal discourse is ... an important site in its own right for the
constitution, consolidation and regulation of sexuality, and in particular the hetero/homo di-
chotom,/.").
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ject matter of litigation and the law/fact distinction."' Generally, be-
cause of hormone technologies and sex reassignment surgery, de-
termining the sex of transsexuals poses the most difficult question to
the courts: how do you determine the sex of an individual born one
sex, still chromosomally of that sex, but who now has the surgically
constructed body and genitalia of the opposite sex?
Deconstructing the social and legal constructions of sex and sex-
ual identity is crucial to explicating how transsexuals' sexuality has
limited their constitutional rights. This paper will analyze sex and
sexual identity in a critical manner to clarify the complex relationship
between these social and legal constructions; only after explicating
that relationship is it possible to uncover how that relationship
should be articulated to best further equity and justice and simulta-
neously gain transsexuals basic constitutional freedoms, such as the
right to marry, that stem from the liberty to identify their own sex.
The realization of such constitutional rights is an important and es-
sential step to ending animus against transsexuals, who are marginal-
ized through discrimination and prejudice or victimized through vio-
lent acts or hate speech simply because their sexual status is perceived
as "deviant."8
The first three sections of this Comment establish the social and
legal context for analyzing the constitutional implications of trans-
7 Id.
8 As Phyllis Randolph Frye, a male-to-female postoperative transsexual, attorney and activist
who is the central spokesperson for transsexual rights, asserts, "the transgendered are almost
always discriminated against by the same people and for the same reasons as homosexuals and
bisexuals are discriminated against." Employment Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians: Federal
"Sexual Orientation" Employment Protection Bill Must Include the Transgendered, 1994 WL 392889
(July 29, 1994 F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Phyllis Randolf Frye before the Senate Labor Comm'n)
[hereinafter Testimony of Phyllis Randolf Frye]. A shocking array of experiences were related
by Frye in her testimony before the Senate regarding a federal "Sexual Orientation" Employ-
ment Protection Bill on July 29, 1994:
In 1972 as a ILT US Army, I was discharged against my will, honorably, based upon my
cross-dressing off-post and off-duty. In 1973 1 was fired on the 'rumor' that I cross-
dressed in private. I was designing artificial limbs at the time, and was fired by a man-
ager who was sleeping with his secretary while both of them were married to other peo-
ple. In 1976 1 was fired on the basis that I cross-dressed in private. At that time I was
project engineer at a petrochemical plant. There was never any allegation about my
work product being poor. Nor did I ever cross-dress at work. I came to terms with my
transsexual nature and began my full-time transition shortly thereafter. I NEVER was
hired again. NEVER. I existed on the small income of my spouse, on charity, on unem-
ployment compensation, on infrequent engineering fees from a gay architect and from
retailing Amway products, mostly to gay bars. It was not until I began to practice law in
1986 that the ten year nightmare came to an end. Being transgendered is a tough row to
hoe. Just imagine for yourself, if your gender did not 'fit' to some degree. The trans-
gendered catch it from employers, police, bashers, landlords, insurance companies, the
military, the churches and the divorce courts. Our families are often nonsupportive: in-
deed, my parents and siblings have disowned me for all of these 18 years.
[Vol. 5:1
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sexuality. While there is some degree of conflation between trans-
sexuals and other non-heterosexual sexualities, this Comment will
only address transgendered individuals and will not focus on gender
or identity issues with respect to other subordinated sexualities. 9 Part
I of this Comment will consider the natures of and relationships be-
tween sex and sexual identity, free of any discussion of "gender iden-
tity disorders" or transsexualism, to explicate what these concepts
have come to mean in American culture by examining them in a sub-
jective, symbolic manner. This is a particularly apt way to begin elu-
cidating the nature of these concepts. Queer scholars and transsexu-
als themselves often urge that the law adopt a means by which
individuals could self-identify their own sex for legal purposes. Only
after such an explication will it become apparent why self-
identification is not a viable means to legally determine sex. In Part
II, this Comment will define transsexualism, explaining why transsex-
ualism provides the law with conundrums that transvestitism and al-
ternative sexualities, such as homosexuality and bisexuality, do not.
Part II of this Comment will also review the present legal treatment of
transsexuality and its implications, detailing the various subjective
and objective approaches courts have adopted.
The final sections of this Comment will examine the constitu-
tional implications of transsexuality in light of their unique social and
legal context. Part III of this Comment will address the question of
whether all, or indeed any, transsexuals have a liberty interest in self-
defining their legal sex. Part III will also explain alternative legal
treatments of transsexualism, and reveal why a unique approach that
blends subjective self-identification and objective genital identifica-
tion is mandated when one weighs the interests of objective consis-
tency and equity. An effective conclusion can only be reached by
tempering the legal need for objectivity with equity concerns; most
importantly, in the interests of equity and consistency, courts must
adopt a uniform standard in resolving the troubling questions of sex
and sexual identity that have arisen in the courtroom.
I. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEX AND SEXUAL IDENTITY
In determining whether sex and sexual identity are biological
principles, socio-cultural constructions, or both, we must consider the
9 For discussions of these subordinated sexualities, see, for example, Carl F. Stychin, Identi-
ties, Sexualities, and the Postmodern Subject: An Analysis of Artistic Funding by the National Endowment
for the Arts, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79 (1994); Carl F. Stychin, Inside and Out of the Military,
3 LAW& SEXUALIY 27 (1993).
10 See generally Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Be-
tween Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1999) (discussing the need for definitions of the
terms "male" and "female" for legal purposes).
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dominant social and legal perception that sex is a biological con-
struct, while sexual identity, or gender, is the social counterpart to
sex. By analyzing sex and sexual identity as bodily-texts, we can de-
construct these concepts, demystifying debates over sex and sexual
identity by explicating the ideological properties inherent in our bod-
ies-as-texts. Social deconstruction is a particularly valuable tool as it
"is an exercise in exposing the unassailable truth as myth;"" it reveals
how social constructs of sex and sexual identity are intertextually
mapped onto the transsexual body. After applying such a subjective
theory, we will see that it is unworkable in practice and we can at last
fully understand why a different approach is needed within a legal
context.
A. Existing Scholarly Perspectives on Sex and Sexual Identity
Katherine M. Franke12 and Julie A. Greenberg 3 have both ad-
dressed the issues of sex and sexual identity from a social construc-
tionist perspective. 4 Incorporating the social constructivist perspec-
tive into an analysis of sex and sexual identity within the perspective
of sex discrimination, Franke notes that "[s]ex is regarded as a pro-
duce of nature, while gender is understood as a function of culture,"
and emphasizes that this "disaggregation of sex from gender repre-
sents a central mistake of equality jurisprudence." 5  She further ar-
gues that "almost every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex dis-
crimination can be shown to be grounded in normative gender rules
and roles."'1 Therefore, Franke asserts that we must consider the "so-
cial processes that construct and make coherent the categories male
and female."'7 This is accomplished by understanding sexual identity
"not in deterministic, biological terms, but according to a set of be-
havioral, performative norms that at once enable and constrain a de-
gree of human agency and create the background conditions for a
11 SUSAN S. M. EDWARDS, SFX AND GENDER IN THE LEGAL PROcsSS 3 (1996).
12 See Katherine M. Franke, The Cntral Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995).
13 See Greenberg, supra note 10.
14 This perspective entails the realization that "every day, in life's most trivial and momen-
tous moments, we interpret our experiences in ways that create not only facts, but meaningful
facts." Franke, supra note 12, at 70. As Franke notes, this is usually made possible through the
"acquisition and internalization of publicly agreed upon points of view or reference." Id.
Franke posits that we view bodies from an idealized point of view, and that we approach the
question of whether an individual is male or female as a question of fact to get "right or wrong."
Id. at 70-71. The sticking point is that "we have so thoroughly internalized the points of view
that allow us to 'get factual questions right' that we no longer notice that right answers fre-
quently contradict our direct observations of the world." Id. at 71.
15 Id. at 1-2.
6 ld. at 2.
17 Id. at 3.
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person to assert, I am a woman [or I am a man]."'8 A social construc-
tivist perspective, then, appears to offer a unique vantage point for
analyzing the constitutional implications of sex and sexual identity in
the context of transsexualism, for "[t] his conception of sexual iden-
tity ultimately provides the basis for a fundamental right to determine
gendered identity independent of biological sex."'9 Seen in the social
constructivist light, then, a body is not an independent "biological
given which emits its own meaning"20 but a socially constructed or-
ganism to which meaning is assigned through interpretation.
Greenberg, too, posits that "[s]ex is commonly used to denote
one's status as a man or woman based upon biological factors" and
differentiates sex, "a reflection of one's biology," from gender, "which
is generally considered to be socially constructed. 2 1 Within the spe-
cific context of transsexualism, she notes that "the biological aspect
of one's body that determines one's sex has not been legally or medi-
-,,22
cally resolved. Greenberg also confronts the "either/or" sex cate-
gorization of male and female, asserting that it is unrealistic as "sex
and gender range across a spectrum;" "[m] ale and female occupy the
two ends of the poles, and a number of intersexed conditions exist
between the two poles.,
23
There is a more useful way of examining sex and sexual identity
that incorporates both Franke's emphasis on the social construction
of sex and sexual identity and Greenberg's argument that social con-
text determines the biological construction of sex and sexual identity.
Similarly, sex and sexual identity are socialized bodily characteristics
that people rationalize, interpret, and discuss. Most significantly for
the purposes of this analysis, courts memorialize and normalize cer-
tain constructions of sex and sexual identities that are rationalized
through judicial analysis and discussion. Therefore, sex and sexual
identity are discursive constructs in their own right, but constructs
that are subordinated to and mapped onto the human body that is
the interpretive focus. Thus, it seems particularly apt to analyze sex
and gender from a more discursive social constructivist perspective-
that of the body-as-text. To the best of my knowledge, this particular
18 Id. at 3-4.
19 Franke, supra note 12, at 4.
20 Id. at 71 (quotingJEFFREY'WEEKS, SEXUALITYAND ITS DISCONTENTS 122-23 (1985)).
21 Greenberg, supra note 10, at 271.
22 Id. Greenberg emphasizes that the social or legal context in which sex is determined dic-
tates which biological aspect will be the key to identifying which bodily aspect determines one's
sex. In other words, "the biological factor(s) that control sex determination may vary depend-
ing upon the purpose for which sex is being defined." Id. at 273. For example, in determining
sex for purposes of birth certificate documentation "the appearance of the external genitalia
typically determines the sex assigned;" in contrast, in other contexts such as athletic contests sex
may be determined by "chromosomal structure." Id. at 273-74.
23 ,,
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detailing of the body-as-text is my own creation; I am the first to detail
this concept within this context, although other authors have articu-
lated the concept of a body-as-text.
24
B. The Body-as-Text
1. The Concept of Text
The concept of text starts with the more abstract concept of dis-
course. A discourse is a way of organizing social thought, one com-
prised of myriad ideologies all focused around a common theme.
The investiture of ideology into a discourse takes place within the
context of social practice that precedes and influences the discourse.
Thus, discourse must be analyzed as a rearticulation of ideology, not
simply as a conglomeration of independent ideologies.25
The ideological investiture of discourse is manifested in text, the
forum in which discourse, itself an abstraction, appears in more con-
crete form. A text is a tangible product that is inscribed with a dis-
course and so is the actual embodiment of an expression, discourse
incarnate. Only the readers of a text may assign it meaning, and
they are aided in their sense-making by the textual form itself. Just as
words, sentences, and paragraphs are constructed and organized into
specific patterns to achieve some coherent meaning, so are texts de-
signed and organized to yield certain "interpretative positions."
These "interpretative positions" are the result of the infusion of dis-
course into concrete textual form. A text does not have meaning in
and of itself; its readers assign it meaning.2 This act of interpretation
is a reconstruction of the interpretive clues, a piecing together of the
ideological properties of discourse embedded in the text. Therefore,
a text is not a closed system of meaning, but one that is open; not
merely a system expressive of a narrow set of specific ideological
properties, but one that is constructive, allowing for an interplay of
24 See KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF Us 12 (1994);
Sandy Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto, in BODY GUARDS 292, 295 (Julia
Epstein & Kristina Straub eds., 1991); Susan Stryker, My Words to Victor Frankenstein Above the Vil-
lage of Chamounix: Performing Transgender Rage, I GLQ: J. LESBIAN& GAYSTUD. 237, 238 (1994).
As Norman Fairclough asserts, "[d]iscourses do not just reflect or represent social entities
and relations, they construct or 'constitute' them; different discourses constitute key enti-
ties.., in different ways, and position people in different ways as social subjects." NORMAN
FAIRCLOUGH, DISCOURSE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 3-4 (1992).
26 Futhermore, a text is only a presentation or re-presentation of structural and ideological
properties of the discourse it is invested with, and contains no meaning in and of itself.
Readers, those who interpret and assign meaning to texts, never approach any text from
an unbiased perspective. The interpreter is embedded in a social matrix, just as a text is em-
bedded in fields of social practice. The reader's interpretations of those forms are related to
prior experience in the life world that she inhabits.
[Vol. 5:1
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ideological and interpretive properties. Such a conception of "text"
is above all a "communicative" conception.
2. The Concept of Text Applied to the Body
The concept of text is not limited to linguistic parameters. Physi-
cal objects, such as the human body, can also serve as texts. In han-
dling the body as a text, we enter the realm of intertextuality. The
signs that adorn the human body are every bit as eloquent as those
uttered or appearing on the printed page. Signs such as clothing and
mannerisms are but dust jackets that cover these walking, talking
texts that are more complex than any novel (yet ones we read much
more quickly). Just as the circumspect author chooses his words in
light of style and context, so do we all dress and adorn ourselves,
carry and express ourselves in light of tastes and habits that seem
"personal" but are really re-created from other outside influences. I
use the term "subtext" to denote bodily narratives, such as sex and
sexual identity, that an author inscribes upon her own bodily text and
that are in turn interpreted, reconstructed, and reassigned onto the
author's body by Others.28
The body-as-text is more than just a collection of subtexts;
through interpretation, it becomes a re-articulation of the body, an
improvised, multi-dimensional way of interpreting, or reading, the
body, a description of the body as seen by the social eye. Sex and
sexual identity are at the epicenter of the body-as-text. These sub-
texts are unique from other bodily-texts in that the social and ideo-
logical constructions of each evolve from and respond to (either con-
form to or reject) a biological nexus, a sexual "starting point"
provided by nature. Medical experts have identified eight recognized
criteria of sex: chromosomal sex (XX for female, or XY for male),
gonadal sex (evidently reproductive sex glands, consistent with
chromosomal sex), sex hormone pattern (hormones secreted by tes-
tes/ovaries that produce gender characteristics), internal sex organs
(ovaries/testes), genital sex (external sex organs), habitus (bodily
form and appearance), assigned sex, and sex role (a psychological
aspect of sexual identity).2" It is upon these biological texts that the
social elements of sex and sexual identity are inscribed by the author,
or owner, of a bodily text and by those Others that see, reinterpret,
and reassign meaning to these texts.
The process of inscription takes place in the following manner.
Two inscriptions, or assignments of meaning, occur simultaneously.
28 I have elected to capitalize "Self" and "Other" in this Comment to conform with the usage
of these terms in social constructivist scholarship.
2) DAVIDW. MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODYAND THE LAW 221-22 (2d ed. 1990).
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At the same time as individuals elect to portray, or construct, their sex
and sexual identity in certain ways, others, consciously or uncon-
sciously, read these bodily-texts, deconstruct their sexual discourses,
and assign other meanings to these texts. These processes of encod-
ing and decoding necessarily involve a complex interplay of sex and
sexual identity. An individual may cast herself as a feminine female
or a masculine female, she may reject her sexual identity and seek to
become "male" in dress or mannerism, or she may reject both her sex
and her sexual identity and undergo sexual reassignment surgery to
become a physical "male."30
The chief strength of the body-as-text is that it is a concept that
will go anywhere, for anybody. In mainstream discourse that cele-
brates the male/female dichotomy, the body-as-text brings the out-
side inside, normalizing what is perceived as somehow "deviant,"'
placing transsexuals on the same footing as "GG"s, or "genetic natu-
rals, "' while at the same time preserving the differences between the
heteronormative and the transsexual. In this image, difference is not
subordinated difference; difference is diversity, valued, equally viable,
and certainly not inferior. The body-as-text enables the transsexual
body to be "normalized" for legal discourse, re-articulated as a con-
struction that is intelligible to those who cannot escape the bipolar
confines of male and female. Therefore, the body-as-text becomes a
potential vehicle for constitutional rights, realizing rights for trans-
sexuals that nontranssexuals accept as a matter of course. The body-
as-text recaptures a personhood perspective, refocusing rights not on
the sexual self, but on the body, or whole self.
Just as it helps to "normalize" the transsexual body, the body-as-
text provides a site of resistance for transsexuals to defy the means by
which such "normalizing" distorts transsexual identity. 3 3 Advocating
Before proceeding further with this analysis, I deem it necessary to acknowledge my own
social position as a heterosexual, non-transsexual student and scholar of deconstruction and of
sexuality. As any scholar does, "I become a part of the object of my study as I produce," and
[i]n studying I politicise and theorise the culture of gender and irreversibly change
it .... I, like you, cannot escape the hegemony of gendering but I also have a place in
the power struggle that surrounds it, and I hope to use it responsibly, as I contribute,
from my privileged positions to the culture of gender-blending.
Stephen Wittle, Gender Fucking or Fucking Gender? Current Cultural Contributions to Theories of Gen-
der Blending, in BLENDING GENDERS: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CROSS-DRESSING AND SEX-CHANGING
196-97 (Richard Ekins & Dave King eds., 1996).
31 See Testimony of Phyllis Randolf Frye, supra note 8 (describing the discrimination Frye
endured because she is a transsexual).
32 Stone, supra note 24, at 295.
1M Stone remarks that the "highest purpose of the transsexual is to erase him/herself, to fade
into the 'normal population' as soon as possible." Id. Unfortunately, today's unreceptive social
and legal climates almost always require the transsexual to "normalize" herself and hence to
fade, at least to some degree, to gain legal rights; while we are working towards a society in
[Vol. 5:1
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for and with transsexuals in their struggle to gain constitut-
ional equality must not be confused with helping them to erase their
transsexual selves. Indeed, we must encourage not only legal empo-
werment, but social empowerment, empowerment through the "abil-
ity to authentically represent the complexities of lived experience" as
a transsexual." Because the body-as-text captures the truth that bod-
ies are sites of negotiation and contestation, the body-as-text can be
reappropriated by transsexuals to render visible their own unique ex-
periences. Transsexuals can take back the body-as-text by reclaiming
it from the heteronormativity of the binary male/female and recon-
structing it in their own images. 5 Stone describes her conceptualiza-
tion of a "transsexual as text," in which "we may find the potential to
map the configured body onto conventional gender discourse and
thereby disrupt it, to take advantage of the dissonances created by
such a juxtaposition to fragment and reconstitute the elements of
gender in new and unexpected geometries. ''  This would not be
constituting transsexuals as "a class or problematic 'third gender' but
rather as a genre--a set of embodied texts whose potential for produc-
tive disruption of structured sexualities and spectra of desire has yet
to be explored.
3 7
3. Sex and Sexual Identity and the Body-as-Text
Using this understanding of the body-as-text as a starting point, we
can begin to examine more closely the concepts of sex and sexual
identity. Both emanate from and in response to biological character-
istics. But each is not restricted to this narrow realm. "Objective" sex
and "subjective" sexual identity are interdependent; both are impor-
tant actors in the interplay of social construction whose roles are con-
strained only by the biological characteristics that tether them. Yet,
they are distinct concepts. With biological characteristics as a starting
point, sex is constructed from building blocks of anatomy and gen-
der; "sex" is the meta-concept that an interpreter arrives at after read-
ing and assigning meaning to another's sexual signs and strategies.
After all, it is the "deployment of sexuality, with its different strate-
which such fading will not be necessary, that point has not yet arrived, and meanwhile trans-
sexuals still need to be recognized as the constitutional equals of nontranssexals.
Id.
As Stone asserts, "in the case of the transsexual, the varieties of performative gender seen
against a culturally intelligible gendered body which is itself a medically constituted textual violence,
generate new and unpredictable dissonance which implicates entire spectra of desire." Id.
36 Id. at 296.
37 Id.
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gies" that establishes the notion of one's sex." Thus, "sex" is an um-
brella term, the concept that represents gender and biological char-
acteristics together in their entirety."
It is important to emphasize, therefore, that from a social con-
structivist perspective, sex is not a real concept that one can proudly
point to and pronounce as "sex;" it is but "an ideal construct which is
forcibly materialized through time." 4°  Not surprisingly, bodies are
changing texts, and "sex" evolves along with its bodily bearer.4' Most
importantly, "sex" has socially significant meaning in a personal and
communal sense, for ultimately "[s] ex! is a cultural command that all
bodies understand and recognize themselves in a specific way, an
identification of our bodies that we are forced to carry around and
produce on demand."42 As the need to legally define sex so clearly
illustrates, "[t] o participate in society, we must be sexed."43
C. Delusions of Gender
As a component of the meta-concept of sex, we all possess what
Stephen Wittle has termed "gender identity," a "total perception of
an individual about his or her own gender," that includes "a basic
personal identity as a boy or girl, man or woman, as well as personal
judgments about the individual's level of conformity to the societal
norms of masculinity and femininity." Simultaneously, a second
construction of gender exists, one with a different locus centered not
in the Self but in the Other, but one that is of equal social impor-
tance. "Gender role," or gender as it is perceived by Others, is inter-
dependent on gender identity, "since most people show their percep-
tions of themselves in their dress, manners, and activities.,45 Wnen we
assign gender roles to Others, we engage in "gender attribution,"
38 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALtIY 154 (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon
Books 1978).
.19 As Foucault posits,
The notion of"sex" ma[kes] it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomi-
cal elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enable[s]
one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent mean-
ing ... sex [i]s thus able to function as a unique signifier and a universal signified.
Id. at 154.
40 Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and Heteronormativity, 10 LAW &
SEXUALITY 123, 161 (2001).
41 Sex is not a "'static condition of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms material-
ize."' Id. (quoting JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATFER-ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 1
(1993)).
42 Id. at 164.
43 Id.
44 STEPHEN WHITLE, THE TRANSGENDER DEBATE: THE CRISIS SURROUNDING GENDER
IDENITIY 5 (2000).
45 Id. at 5-6.
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based on an "intricate system of cues, varying from culture to cul-
ture," ranging from physical appearance and behavior to "context,
and the use of power."6
The meta-concept of sex has traditionally been defined using the
binary terms of male or female (leaving aside the question of the true
sexual hermaphrodite) that are assumed to correspond at least
roughly to biological characteristics. On the other hand, sexual iden-
tity or gender, (as it will now be termed to avoid confusion with "sex"
as a meta-concept), is essentially a qualitative spectrum of social con-
struction that spans from the completely "feminine" female at one
extreme to the ultimately "masculine" male at the other. As Green-
41
berg suggests, at no time is anyone at either of these extremes.
While the Self chooses to locate itself at some specific point on the
spectrum and constructs bodily-texts to reflect this posturing, outside
Others assign the Selves that they encounter to specific points on the
spectrum after assigning meaning upon interpreting the textual in-
terplay of sex and gender. Meaning is symmetrical when an individ-
ual's perceptions of sex and gender approximate those of Others that
interpret it, and asymmetrical when an individual's perceived sex and
gender are at odds with Others' interpretations. It is in this instance,
when one's self-assigned sex and gender seem "authentic" to that in-
dividual while seeming false to others, that one wonders which is the
"real" interpretation of sex and gender and which is the "illusion."
This "illusion" most often occurs when one's "gender" does not
equate with one's "genitalia. '" 8 This conundrum is the theoretical lo-
cus of legal confusion over determinations of sex and gender. It is
essential to note that even though it is perceived as an "internal" so-
cially constructed condition as opposed to "external" biologicallyv
constructed anatomy, gender is immutable and does not change.
And while the evolution and development of gender is an intensely
personal and subjective experience, it is an experience that is shared
by everyone, and is "culturally and objectively observed."'
The strength of the social constructivist approach is that it pre-
serves gender as a "real" concept, preventing the analyst who does
not understand or does not appreciate the personal and communal
realities of its socially constructed nature from consigning it entirely
to the realms of illusion. One "must not place sex on the side of real-
ity, and sexuality on that of confused ideas and illusions; sexuality is a
very real historical formation; it is what gives rise to the notion of sex,
46 Id. at 7.
47 Greenberg, supra note 10, at 275.
4 Weiss, supra note 40, at 158.
49 Id.
5 Id. at 159.
Oct. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONS77TUIONAL LAW
as a speculative element necessary to its operation."'" A deconstruc-
tion of gender makes plain the distinction between the subjective and
the illusionary; gender emerges in its concrete form upon the text of
the body in its myriad social constructions and interpretations. Ironi-
cally, deconstruction of the body's sexual texts calls into question the
traditional empirical imperialism of objectivity. 2
Before the social constructivist perspective and the implications of
the body-as-text platform forced us to become conscious of the con-
structed natures of biological (or "objective") sex and its socio-
cultural (or "subjective") counterpart, gender, we believed in the fic-
tion of the objective, autonomous individual. This individual, who
was believed to be unbiased and free of the social matrix and its ac-
companying myths and ideologies, strides forth boldly to confront life
as a tabula rasa or blank slate, subject to no one's whim but his own.
But this image is now easy to dispel. We have already seen that no
individual is autonomous; by nature of our bodily-texts, we are all
caught up in the social matrix, in a permanent marriage of ideologi-
cal interplay. It appears that we need to reexamine the attainability
of objectivity, perhaps recasting it into a less brilliant ideal, a more
human "goal" that acknowledges our indivisibility from the social ma-
trix. True objectivity is a fiction; every human has preexisting biases
that work unconsciously and subconsciously, so that one never knows
exactly when they are in play. Nonetheless, the human struggle to
achieve such objectivity is the force that renders it "real." While ob-
jective impartiality as an ideal may be a myth, something akin to im-
partiality, an awareness of bias and its influence upon personal ac-
tions and reaction is not. Seen in this light, the human endeavor to
achieve objectivity entails the recognition and appreciation of the
power and the reality of the subjective. While this awareness does not
allow one to remove the ideological tints that color the world she
sees, it does allow her to realize that these tints exist and that they
work upon her images of Self and Other. Knowing that such tints ex-
51 FOUCAULT, supra note 38, at 158.
52 If so much of sex is socially constructed, and not determined by objectively verifiable ten-
ets of anatomy and biology, then what constitutes an objective "sex," readily ascertainable
through "impartial" observation? Now objective "sex" itself may appear to be the illusion. As
Ronald Dworkin posits in the context of legal philosophy,
Is there any objective truth? Or must we finally accept that at bottom, in the
end ... there is no 'real' or 'objective' or 'absolute' or 'foundational' or 'fact of the mat-
ter' or 'right answer' truth about anything, that even our most confident convictions
about what happened in the past or what the universe is made of or who we are ... are
just our convictions,jtust conventions,just ideology.
Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. No. 2, Spring
1996, at 87.
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ist, she can now try to make her image of the world more authentic,
and hence more reliable, than it was before.
Law itself appears to provide a socially significant objective stan-
dard; convention codified is the rule of law. Of course, "[t]he nas-
cent body in law is given supreme legal significance," and "[z]ones
are accorded meaning and legal significance for sex and social
status."' Ultimately, "persons are controlled through the physical
body which is a gateway and corridor to rights.,'55 Agents of the law
would have us believe that they survey and classify bodies with an ob-
jective eye. However, objectivity is just as elusive in the courtroom
and legislative hall as it is in the workaday world. Like most other
governmental institutions, law "makes claims to neutrality, to objectiv-
ity, and to universality., 56 As Susan Edwards asserts, "[i]n law, as else-
where, concepts are given a significance and authorised as a priori
valid. ''57  However, in the wake of deconstruction, we must now ac-
knowledge that inherent "[i]n the application of [the] scientific
method to law is the false premise that all subjectivity and partiality
will be washed away.
58
II. JUDICIAL IMAGES OF TRANSSEXUALS
The principles just covered have been exactly that-principles,
from theory, that can easily be distinguished from those that emerge
from practice. What happens when we apply these conceptions of
subjectivity and objectivity to transsexualism? A detailed investigation
into the nature of transsexualism immediately reveals its challenge to
the legal community: "the examination of the limits of our ability to
know what exists and does not exist."59 This challenge is particularly
complex in constitutional law, for judicial interpretations of sex and
gender dictate the rights of transsexuals in several ways that will be
addressed in the following section. Defining transsexualism, there-
53 Only now, after we have recast objectivity, have the scales dropped from our eyes; we now
recognize that the pluralities of subjectivity do exist, that they are in fact "real." At the same
time, we can appreciate the true nature of objectivity, an ongoing struggle to make one's images
of Others and of the social environment more authentic and more reliable, a quest to see past
the subjective tint to what lies beyond. We become unconventionally aware of the conventional,
able to acknowledge universally accepted myths. And so at the end, like sex and gender, the
subjective and the objective play like Yin the dark and Yang the light, confusion and peace,
chasing each other about in a perpetual eddy, each trying to catch the other, but never quite
succeeding.
54 EDWARDS, supra note 11, at 51.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1.
57 Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
5,) Weiss, supra note 40, at 155.
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fore, sets forth the context and contests of sex and gender that have
profound constitutional implications for transsexuals.
A. Transsexualism Defined
As defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders, or the DSM-IV, transsexualism, officially termed Gender Identity
Disorder ("GID"), or gender dysphoria, includes both "evidence of a
strong and persistent cross-gender identification" (defined as "the de-
sire to be, or the insistence that one is, of the other sex"), and "a per-
sistent discomfort about one's assigned sex."6 While the DSM-IV is
cited by many legal authorities and seems to be the definitive psy-
chiatric source on transsexualism, transsexuals themselves contest
this psychiatric classification of transsexualism, urging instead the as-
sumption of a medical categorization. 2 While it is essential to be
mindful of this perspective while wading through legal and social sci-
entific materials that overwhelmingly place transsexualism in a psy-
chiatric context, this Comment discusses transsexualism within a psy-
chiatric context because this is still the conventional perspective from
which this condition is constructed.
60 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532,
533 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
61 See, e.g., Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1987) (referring to DSM-IV to
support a description of transsexualism); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1984) (referring to DSM-IV to support a description of transsexualism); Smith v. Rasmus-
sen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (referring to DSM-IV in a discussion of gender iden-
tity disorder); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 288 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(citing DSM-1V's definition of a transsexual).
6 A Joint Statement by the International Conference on Transgender Law and Employment Policy and
The National Center for Lesbian Rights, INT'L CONE. ON TRANSGENDER L. & EMP. POL'Y PROC, 5, A-
1, A-2 (1996). This statement asserts that its adherents
strongly believe that transsexualism should become a medical rather than a psychiatric
status. The existing system of access to and reimbursement for transition-related health
care is grossly inadequate, because it vests psychiatrics with far too much power over ac-
cess to hormones and all corrective surgeries, because that power is far too often abused,
and because the vast majority of transsexuals are excluded from any hope of reimburse-
ment for transition-related care. We believe that shifting transsexualism from a psychiat-
ric to a medical status will help to alleviate these problems .... We also believe that
transgendered people need and deserve explicit civil rights protections. For a number
of reasons, we do not believe that the disability rights model is either the only or the
most effective way to win civil rights protections for transgendered people .... Legal
protections based on GID as a psychiatric disability have some serious drawbacks, not the
least of which is the perpetuation of a stereotype that transgendered people are inher-
ently disturbed or unstable. Accepting the notion that we are mentally ill in order to
gain some limited protections on the basis of disability will not protect transgendered
parents who are denied custody or the right to adopt because they have a mental im-
pairment which renders them unsuitable parents. Nor will it necessarily provide trans-
gendered people with comprehensive protection againstjob discrimination. Even under
ADA, the extent to which employers must accommodate people with mental illnesses is
highly contested and unclear.
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In general, Gender Identity Disorder is "manifested by symptoms
such as preoccupation with getting rid of primary and secondary sex
characteristics (e.g., request for hormones, surgery, or other proce-
dures to physically alter sex characteristics to simulate the other sex)
or belief that he or she was born the wrong sex."6' Individuals with a
concurrent physical intersex condition, such as hermaphrodites,
should not be diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, for "indi-
viduals with Gender Identity Disorder have normal genitalia (in con-
trast to the ambiguous genitalia or hypogonadism found in physical
intersex conditions)."6 People of all ages, from young children to
adults, can manifest symptoms of Gender Identity Disorder. The
DSM-IV describes Gender Identity Disorder in children in broad
terms."' Although statistics are not cited, the DSM-IV asserts that only
a few children emerging into later adolescence or adulthood "will
continue to have symptoms that meet criteria for Gender Identity
Disorder."' Adults with Gender Identity Disorder are preoccupied
with their desire to live as a member of the opposite sex, and "to vary-
ing degrees, they adopt the behavior, dress, and mannerisms of the
other sex," engaging in cross-dressing and hormonal treatment.
67
When adults are diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, "it tends
to have a chronic course, but spontaneous remission has been re-
ported." 8 For all those with cross-gender identification, "[t]he dis-
turbance can be so pervasive that the mental lives of some individuals
revolve only around those activities that lessen gender distress.'"'6 The
DSM-IV distinguishes Gender Identity Disorder from simple "non-
conformity to stereotypical sex role behavior" by the extent of an in-
dividual's cross-gender identification; Gender Identity Disorder rep-
resents not mild discomfort but a "profound disturbance. '"7 ° The
disorder can also be distinguished from transvestitism; transvestic fet-
DSM-IV, supra note 60, at 538.
64 Id. at 535.
Boys with "cross-gender identification" may be preoccupied with traditionally feminine
activities such as dressing in girls' clothing, playing house, identifying with female characters
such as princesses or beautiful girls, and playing with "female-type dolls, such as Barbie." Id. at
533. In addition, they may sit to urinate and pretend not to have a penis. Id. Girls, in contrast,
do not wish to wear feminine clothing and prefer boys' clothes and haircuts, and show little in-
terest in traditionally female toys and games, preferring contact sports and "rough-and-tumble
play." Id. In addition, they may refuse to urinate in a sitting position, may claim to have pe-
nises, and may not want to grow breasts or menstruate. Id.
Id. at 536.
67 Id. at 533.
DSM-IV, supra note 60, at 536.
6 Id. at 535.
70 Id. at 536.
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ishism occurs in heterosexual or bisexual men who cross-dress for
sexual excitement.
71
The psychiatric community currently hails sex reassinment sur-
gery as the only "effective" treatment for transsexualism. According
to the standards of care presented by the Harry Benjamin Interna-
tional Gender Dysphoria Association, a clinical behavioral scientist
recommending sex reassignment surgery should know a transsexual
patient for at least six months.7' Sex reassignment surgery should be
preceded by a period of at least twelve months when the transsexual
lives as a member of the self-identified sex on a full-time basis.74
We may now return to our subjective explications of sex and gen-
der and recall that while sex is at once a physical fact, it is also an
ideal, as we constantly "create artificial standards of normality to
which we must continually strive to conform."75 While most people
deviate only marginally or temporarily from "the ideal set of behav-
iors which in our culture we associate with males and females" in
seemingly random patterns that are easily "excused" by others, trans-
sexuals "consistently and coherently deviate from society's ideal so far
as to fall outside of the range traditionally associated with their sex." 76
And so while a transsexual's gender "is essentially congruent
throughout his or her life," it is always at odds with his or her birth
sex.77 Largely due to the socially imposed dichotomy of man and
woman, male and female, "the transsexual does not exist in social or
even less in legal language. The modern transsexual remains an
enigma, regarded by and large as a 'sexual' deviant bent on distorting
and challenging a natural body form."78
B. Do Transsexuals Have a Liberty Interest in Defining Their Own Sex?
Before this query can be fully addressed, it is necessary to have a
comprehensive understanding of the judicial treatment of transsex-
ualism and its implications in various legal contexts. Only then can
we fully analyze whether transsexuals have a constitutional right, or a
liberty interest, in self-defining their own sex. If it is determined that
71 Id.
"2 See Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (recognizing the opinion of
the psychiatric community and holding that sex reassignment in this case was "medically neces-
sary").
7.9 HARRY BENJAMIN INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS OF CARE:
THE HORMONAL AND SURGICAL SEX REASSIGNMENT OF GENDER DYSPHORIC PERSONS § 4.8.1
(1990) [hereinafter HARRY BENJAMIN, STANDARDS OF CARE].
74 Id. at § 4.9.1.
75, Weiss, supra note 40, at 161.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 162.
78 EDWARDS, supra note 11, at 9.
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transsexuals do indeed have such an interest, profound changes
would have to be made in the current methods which courts use to
define legal sex; no longer could a judge impose his or her idea of a
proper sex assignment on a transsexual. Rather, transsexuals would
be the ultimate authority in defining their own sex.
From the perspective of "any transsexual struggling to achieve
recognition in the newly assigned postoperative sex, the right to pri-
vacy and to alter the birth certificate in order to ensure legal congru-
ity with the new sexual status[] remains fundamentally necessary."'7'
Transsexuals do not yet have a liberty interest in defining their own
sex; no court in the cases discussed below has officially held that
transsexuals have a universal right to self-identify their legal sex. Al-
though courts have allowed postoperative transsexuals to self-identify
their sex on a case-by-case basis, these case-by-case determinations do
not translate into a universal right for transsexuals to self-identify
their own sex. However, the law has granted transsexuals a few lim-
ited liberty interests, including a liberty interest in dressing in their
self-identified sex for purposes of therapys° and a limited right to re-
ceive some form of continuing medical treatment while incarcerated,
though no right to receive any specific treatment."' These limited
liberty interests by no means translate into a broader liberty interest
allowing transsexuals to self-define their legal sex. As will become
readily apparent in later sections, however, just because a liberty in-
terest in self-identification has not yet been articulated does not mean
that such an interest cannot or will not be articulated. After discuss-
ing judicial perspectives on transsexualism in a variety of legal con-
texts, this Comment will explore how such a liberty interest could
best be articulated under Equal Protection and Due Process argu-
ments.
C. The Judicial Analysis of Transsexualism
Courts have addressed the legal implications of transsexualism in
eight different contexts: requests by transsexuals to change their
names and sexes on official documents such as birth certificates,82 de-termining the legality of marriages between transsexuals and non-
79 Id. at 37.
80 See infra Part 11 (c) (5) for discussion of anti-cross-dressing ordinances and transsexuals.
81 See discussion of transsexual prisoners' right to receive medical treatment, infra Part
II(c) (7).
82 See, e.g., Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975); In re Hartin v. Dir. of Bureau
of Records and Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Anonymous v. Weiner, 270
N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); In re
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Misc. 1987); K. v. Health Div., 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977).
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transsexuals,"' testing transsexuals for athletic events,84 determining
whether transsexuals are covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
discussing whether city ordinances can prevent preoperative trans-
sexuals from dressing in their self-identified sex, considering
whether sex reassignment surgery is medically necessary, assessing
whether transsexual prisoners have a right to seek treatment for
transsexualism while they are incarcerated,8 and granting asylum to
foreign national transsexuals.8 Of these issues, this Comment will
emphasize transsexuals' ability to change their name and sex on offi-
cial documents, to marry, to receive protection under Title VII, and
to dress in the self-identified sex. One common question, however,
echoes throughout all of these issues: is sex reassignment essentially a
form of psychotherapy pertaining to subjective gender, or does it ac-
tually change a patient's sex? A brief review of the cases that have
addressed these issues reveals a general progression towards recogniz-
ing increased rights and providing greater protection for postopera-
tive transsexuals.
1. Changing Name and Sex on Official Documents
In the first American case to deal with transsexualism, Anonymous
v. Weiner, ° a postoperative male-to-female transsexual applied to the
Bureau of Vital Statistics in New York City for a new birth certificate.
&I See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001); M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d
204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999); Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (P.
1970).
See Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
K5 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d
1197 (9th Cir. 2000); Ulane v. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen, 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Maffei v. Kalaeton
Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
W; See, e.g., Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (D. Tex. 1980); City of Chicago v. Wilson, 398
N.E.2d 522 (I1. 1978); Doe ex rel Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060-A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), affd, Doe v. Brockton School Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL
33342399, at*l (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
87 See, e.g., Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
M See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996);
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987); Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D.
Pa. 2001).
89 See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093
(9th Cir. 2000) (electing to grant asylum to a Mexican male-to-female preoperative transsexual,
remarking in dicta that the sexual identity of a male-to-female preoperative transsexual "is im-
mutable because it is inherent in his identity, that "sexual orientation and sexual identity
are... so fundamental to one's identity that a person should not be required to abandon
them," and that "sexual identity goes beyond sexual conduct and manifests itself outwardly, of-
ten through dress and appearance").
90 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
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The Bureau sought advice from the Board of Health, which estab-
lished a commission which, after detailed analysis, issued an opinion
opposed to changing a transsexual's sex on her birth certificate. 91 On
appeal following the denial of her application, the Supreme Court of
New York, looking to the New York City Health Code provisions, held
that an individual's sex could be changed on a birth certificate only
when there was a recording error, not to reflect changes in sex
brought about by sex-reassignment surgery.92 Thus began the legal
trend of holding that sex is determined by biological criteria, and
that any changes in the criteria used for sex determination or
changes in the sexual rights of transsexuals should issue from the
state legislature, not the courts.9 As a necessary corollary, courts have
held, in accordance with so-called correctional statutes enacted by
the legislature, that changes in legal documents such as birth records
should be made only to correct errors.9
Apparently, changes of name were easier to come by, as indicated
by a New York Civil Court granting a change of name to a postopera-
tive transsexual in 1968 and again in 1970. In the 1968 case In re
Anonymous, 95 a postoperative male-to-female transsexual petitioned
the court for an order to change her name and to direct that the sex
on her birth certificate either be changed or that a copy of the order
be attached to the document. The court recognized that "any diffi-
culty presented herein is not so much in the nature of the problem
itself, but in trying to apply, perhaps inadequately, static rules of law
to situations.., which perhaps merit new rules and/or progressive
legislation." The court took the road less traveled by speculating
upon and forming a solution to the conundrum surrounding the fact
that the transsexual's "social sex is determined by his anatomical
[genital] sex."' The court overtly disagreed with the conclusions of
91 The Committee on Public Health of the New York Academy of Medicine approved a re-
port entitled "Change of Sex on Birth Certificates for Transsexuals" on October 4, 1965. In this
report, the Committee concluded that
(1) Male-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males while ostensibly females;
and (2) It is questionable whether laws or records such as the birth certificate should be
changed and thereby used as a means to help psychologically ill persons in their social
adaptation.
See also In re Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Anonymous v. Weiner, 270
N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
92 See In reHartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
93 Meyers, supra note 29, at 225.
94 See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831-32 (Ohio Misc. 1987); K. v. Health Div., 560 P.2d
1070, 1072 (Or. 1977).Q5 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968).
Id. at 837. As the court stated,
[B]y definition, his [the transsexual's) psychological sex, as distinguished from his
anatomical sex, is that of the opposite sex. Absent surgical intervention, there is no
question that his social sex must conform with his anatomical sex, his mental attitude
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the "learned committee" formed by the Board of Health in the initial
1966 case Anonymous v. Weiner and held that "a male transsexual who
submits to a sex-reassignment is anatomically and psychologically a
female in fact."97 In 1970, a less loquacious court agreed to change a
postoperative male-to-female transsexual's name from a male to fe-
male name, provided that the order itself not be used as evidence
that the petitioner's sex had in fact been changed." In 1973, the
holding in In re Hartin v. Dir. of Bureau of Records and Statistics99 upheld
the decision in Weiner, and tangentially endorsed the conclusions
reached by the Board of Health in that case.
A change was in the wings in 1975 in Darnell v. Lloyd,"' when a
postoperative male-to-female transsexual sued the Connecticut
Commissioner of Health to change the sex on her birth certificate
from male to female, and the Commissioner moved for summary
judgment. The court denied the motion, finding that the Commis-
sioner must show some state interest in his refusal to change the
transsexual's birth sex to her current sex. The court also held that a
higher level of scrutiny existed because the fundamental right
to marry could be implicated by changing the transsexual's sex on
her birth certificate."" Two years later in 1977, the Oregon Supreme
Court in K. v. Health Division'0 2 held that no authority existed under
state law to change the birth certificate to reflect changes in name or
postoperative sex as the birth certificate was intended to be a histori-
cal record of the facts existing at the time of birth. Finally, in 1987,
notwithstanding. But once surgical intervention has taken place, whereby his anatomical
sex is made to conform with his psychological sex, is not his position identical to that of
the pseudo-hermaphrodite who has been surgically repaired? Should not society afford
some measure of recognition to the altered situation and afford this individual the same
relief as it does the pseudo-hermaphrodite?
It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a "no
man's land" for those individuals who are neither truly "male" nor truly "female." Yet
the standard is much too fixed for such far-out theories. Rather the application of a
simple formula could and should be the test of gender, and that formula is as follows:
Wlere there is disharmony between the psychological sex and the anatomical sex, the
social sex or gender of the individual will be determined by the anatomical sex. Where,
however, with or without medical intervention, the psychological sex and the anatomical
sex are harmonized, then the social sex or gender of the individual should be made to
conform to the harmonized status of the individual and, if such conformity requires
changes of a statistical nature, then such changes should be made.
Id.
97 Id. at 838.
98 In reAnonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
:) 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding that male-to-female postoperative trans-
sexual whose name was changed to female name by court order could obtain new birth certifi-
cate bearing the female name but could not compel authorities to verify that her sex is female).
100 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975).
101 Id. at 1214.
102 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977).
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an Ohio court heard In re Ladrach,10 3 in which a postoperative male-to-
female transsexual applied to have the sex changed on her birth cer-
tificate;1 4 the court ruled that the birth certificate should not be
changed because under state law, certificates could only be changed
to correct errors, and that there was no error in designating the
transsexual's sex at birth as male.
Now, statutory law permits postoperative transsexuals in nearly all
of the fifty states to change their name and sex on their birth certifi-
cate and receive a new or amended birth certificate. Idaho, Ohio,
and Tennessee will allow transsexuals to change their name but not
their sex.105 Most states will grant transsexuals a new birth certifi-
cate; °6 others grant an amended birth certificate, most often oneS 107
marked "amended" but without the specifying the amended items.
A distinct minority grant an amended birth certificate with the trans-
sexual's name, sex, or both struck out, and the new name or sex
103 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Misc. 1987).
104 The transsexual, who had been married twice before to females, filed an application to
have the sex corrected on her birth certificate after she and her fiance were denied a marriage
license because a judge concluded that the transsexual's birth certificate stated that the trans-
sexual was male. After her initial application was dismissed, the transsexual sought declaratory
judgment to compel authorities to change her birth certificate to reflect her postoperative sex.
See id.
1o5 See Becky Allison, M.D., U.S. States and Canadian Provinces: Instructions for Changing Name
and Sex On Birth Certificate, at http://www.drbecky.com/birthcert.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002)
[hereinafter Instructions for Changing Name and Sex On Birth Certificate].
106 Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-326(a) (4) (1993)); Arkansas (ARK CODE ANN. § 20-
18-307(d) (Michie 2001)); California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFET'Y CODE § 103440 (West 1996));
Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-115(4) (West 2001)); Georgia (GA. CODEANN. §31-10-
23(e) (2002)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 338-17.7(4)(b) (2001)); Illinois (410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 535(d) 17 (West 2001)); Iowa (IOWACODE ANN. § 144.23.3 (West 2001)); Kentucky
(KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.121 (Michie 2002)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.62 (West
2000)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2891(9)(a) (2002)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 71-604.01 (2002)); Nevada (NEV. ADMIN. CODE ch. 440, § 130); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:8-40.12 (West 2002)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-25(D) (Michie 2002)); North
Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2002)); Texas (TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 192.011 (Vernon 2001)) (though the state is refusing to issue such changes after
Littleton); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.15(1)(a) (West 2002)). 1 was unable to locate
specific statutory citations for Delaware, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylva-
nia, South Dakota, and West Virginia; however, procedural details confirming state policies may
be found at Instructions for Changing Name and Sex On Birth Certificate, supra note 105.
107 Alabama (ALA. CODE 22-9A-19 (2002)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-42 (2002));
District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-217(d) (2001)); Kansas (KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 28-17-
(b) (1) (A) (i) (2000)); Maryland (M.D. CODEANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 4-214 (2002)); Massachusetts
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 46 § 13(e) (West 2002)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 4601.1000
(2002)); Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 193.215(9) (West 2002)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-02.1-25 (2002)) (Regulation 33-04-12-02 speaks to the amendment as a result of
Gender Identity change); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 432.235(4) (2001)); Utah (UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-2-11 (2002)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269 (Michie 1999)). I was unable
to locate specific statutory citations for Alaska, Florida, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming; however, procedural details confirming state policies may
be found at Instructions for Changing Name and Sex On Birth Certificate, supra note 105.
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typed above."' Nearly all states require a court order for a name
change; for a change of sex a letter from the surgeon who performed
the sex-reassignment surgery is most often required, though a court
order may be needed as well. " New York is the only state to require
more documentation than a letter from the sex-reassignment sur-
geon." The easiest states in which to change name and sex are
clearly those in which sex is not listed on the birth certificate, such as
Indiana.
The standards for obtaining a change of sex and name on a pass-
port are remarkably different. Preoperative transsexuals can obtain
passports valid for one year, which may be extended if medical
documentation certifying the completion of sex-reassignment surgery
is submitted.
2. Marriage Between Transsexuals and Nontranssexuals
The first court to address the legal validity of a marriage between
a transsexual and a nontranssexual did so in 1970 in the English case
Corbett v. Corbett,"' holding that a marriage between a postoperative
male-to-female transsexual and a male was void as the transsexual's
sex must be determined by biological criteria. 2 The Corbett court ra-
tionalized that the
criteria must.., be biological, for even the most extreme degree of
transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance which
can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads and male
genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable of perform-
ing the essential role of a woman in marriage.1
3
In 1971 in Anonymous v. Anonymous," 4 the New York Supreme
Court held invalid a marriage between a man and a male-to-female
transsexual who was preoperative at the time of the ceremony. The
108 Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-57-21 (2002)); and Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-3-203 (2002)). South Carolina will not issue a new birth certificate, but will attach a card to
the old certificate indicating a change of name and sex. See Instructions for Changing Name and
Sex On Birth Certificate, supra note 105.
"Q The states requiring a court order for a change of sex include Alabama, Arkansas, Mary-
land, Mississippi, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
110 New York requires a letter from surgeon, operative report, letter from therapist, and letter
from primary physician with hormone information. See Instructions for Changing Name and Sex
On Birth Certificate, supra note 105.
H 2 All E.R. 33 (P. 1970). In holding that April Ashley, a postoperative male-to-female trans-
sexual, was not a female for the purposes of marriage, the court in Corbett stated that "sex is
clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called marriage, because it is and always has
been recognised as the union of man and woman. [Tihe validity of the marriage in this case,
[depends] in my judgment, on whether the respondent is or is not a woman." Id. at 48.1I2 Id.
113 Id.
114 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
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court found that the defendant was not a female at the time of the
marriage ceremony, and moreover stated that "it would appear from
the medical articles and other information supplied by counsel, that
mere removal of the male organs would not, in and of itself, change a
person into a true female."" The same court adopted a similar ana-
tomical approach to defining sex in 1974 in B. v. B.," 6 when it an-
nulled the female plaintiffs marriage to a male-to-female transsexual,
stating that "marriage is and always has been a contract between a
man and a woman" and that "[w]hile it is possible that defendant
may function as a male in other situations and in other relationships,
defendant cannot function as a husband by assuming male duties and
obligations inherent in the marriage relationship.""7  However, in
1976, in M. T. v. T., " the New Jersey Superior Court recognized the
right to marry where sex-reassignment surgery either created the abil-
ity for heterosexual relations or where physical appearance and psy-
chological orientation were harmonized. In this case, the court
held that a male-to-female postoperative transsexual was a female
for marital Purposes.'2° Adopting the formula first articulated in In re
Anonymous, the court proposed that, where the psychological sex
differs from the anatomical sex, "the social sex or gender of the indi-
vidual will be determined by the anatomical sex," but where "with or
without medical intervention the psychological sex and the anatomi-
cal sex" do not differ, "the social sex or gender of the individual
should be made to conform to the harmonized status. ' ' 2
In the recent case Littleton v. Prange, 12 the Texas Court of Appeals
returned to the anatomical means of determining sex for purposes of
marriage in holding that Christie Lee Littleton, a male-to-female
transsexual who married Jonathon Littleton as a postoperative trans-
sexual in 1989, lacked standing as Jonathon's spouse under a wrong-
115 Id. at 500.
116 B. v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
17 Id. at 716-17.
118 M.T. v.J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
19 See Meyers, supra note 29, at 226.
120 Explaining its reasoning, the court stated, "we must disagree... that for purposes of mar-
riage sex is somehow irrevocably cast at the moment of birth, and that for adjudging the capac-
ity to enter marriage, sex in its biological sense should be the exclusive standard." Id. at 209.
Instead, the court explained that "[t]he evidence and authority which we have exam-
ined .. show that a person's sex or sexuality embraces an individual's gender, that is, one's self
image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of gender." Id. Utilizing this subjective ap-
proach, the court ultimately concluded that, "for marital purposes if the anatomical or genital
features of a genuine transsexual are made to conform to that person's gender, psyche or psy-
chological sex, then identity by sex must be governed by the congruence of these standards."
Id.
121 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968).
12 M.T, 355 A.2d at 210.
123 9 S.W.3d 223, 230-31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
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ful death statute because "[b]iologically, a post-operative female
transsexual is still a male" and so could not marry another male.' 4
The court also emphasized the seemingly artificial nature of
Christie's femininity. Most recently, in 2001, the opposite approach
was taken by the Kansas Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Gardiner.'26,
In Gardiner, a son claiming to be the sole heir to his father's estate al-
leged that his father's marriage to his wife, J'Noel, a male-to-female
postoperative transsexual, was invalid. After summary judgment was
granted to the son, J'Noel appealed, and the appellate court re-
versed, stating that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether J'Noel was a female at the time of marriage.12  The court
concluded that "the trial court must consider and decide whether an
individual was male or female at the time the individual's marriage
license was issued and the individual was married, not simply what
the individual's chromosomes were or were not at the moment of
birth,"'12 thereby mandating that a "court may use chromosome
makeup as one factor, but not the exclusive factor, in arriving at a de-
cision."2
3. Testing Transsexuals for Participation in Athletic Competition
In 1977, a breakthrough came in regards to testing transsexuals
for participation in athletic events in the landmark case Richards v.
United States Tennis Association,' in which Dr. Renee Richards, a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual and successful tennis player
formerly known as Richard H. Raskind, sought a preliminary injunc-
tion against the United States Tennis Association so that she could
124 Id. at 230.
125 The court remarked that Christie's "female anatomy... is all man-made" and that "[tihe
body that Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have
supplied." Id. at 231. The court fturther stated that there was no room for "soft" arguments, for
'courts are wise not to wander too far into the misty fields of sociological philosophy" and so
ignored the "many fine metaphysical arguments lurking about here involving desire and being,
the essence of life and the power of mind over physics." Id.
1i2 22 P.3d 1086 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
2 Id. at 1110. The court noted that "the evidence in the appellate record to date points to a
conclusion that Marshall [the father] knew of the transsexual nature ofJ'Noel, approved, mar-
ried, and enjoyed a consummated marriage relationship with her." Id.
1 Id.
iS. Id. Other factors that trial courts were directed to consider included "gonadal sex, inter-
nal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotype sex, assigned sex and
gender of rearing, and sexual identity." Id. Most importantly, the Gardiner opinion specified
that the list of factors "should not preclude the consideration of other criteria as science ad-
vances." Id.
VV) 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
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qualify and participate in the U.S. Open as a woman."' The New
York Supreme Court held that the Association's requirement that Ri-
chards pass a sex-chromatin test was "grossly unfair, discriminatory
and inequitable, and violative of her rights under the Human Rights
Law of this state."'
32
4. Transsexuals and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Courts have long disagreed over whether "sex" as defined in Title
VII"'' denotes merely anatomical sex, or includes gender together
with anatomical sex. The earliest cases held that "sex" was to be in-
terpreted narrowly in an anatomical sense, without the implications
of gender. In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,"" the Ninth Circuit
held that a claim of sex discrimination made by a preoperative male-
to-female transsexual employee who was dismissed shortly after her
name was changed on employment records was not actionable under
Title VII.I3 More importantly, the court determined that transsexuals
are not a suspect class for Equal Protection purposes because they
were not a "discrete and insular minority" and it had not been estab-
lished that "transsexuality is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth."'
The second case to address transsexualism and the meaning of sex
under Title VII was Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 1 in which the
Eighth Circuit held that a Title VII suit brought by a preoperative
male-to-female transsexual who was fired because her employment
led to disruption of the work routine was not actionable" as the
131 Richards had been barred from competing as a woman because the Association made her
take a sex-chromatin test known as the Barr body test to determine if she was female, which she
could not pass as her chromosomes were male. The court firther stated that "it seems clear
that defendants knowingly instituted this test for the sole purpose of preventing plaintiff from
participating in the tournament." Id. at 272. The court concluded that "[wihen an individual
such as plaintiff, a successful physician, a husband and father, finds it necessary for his own
mental sanity to undergo a sex reassignment, the unfounded fears and misconceptions of de-
fendants must give way to the overwhelming medical evidence that this person is now female."
Id. at 273.
132 Id.
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(2002) prohibits an employer from taking adverse employment
actions because of an employee's "sex."
13 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). Her employer claimed that she was fired because of per-
sonnel problems caused by the her transitional appearance.
1 Id. at 662. The statute was not actionable because "giving the statute its plain mean-
ing ..... Congress had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind;" the court also noted that
several bills introduced to amend the Civil Rights Act to prevent discrimination against "sexual
preference" had not been enacted into law. Id.
136 Id. at 663 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
137 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
138 This "disruption" occurred when other female employees threatened to quit if the trans-
sexual was allowed to use the women's restroom. Id. at 748-49.
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court did "not believe that Congress intended by its laws prohibiting
sex discrimination to require the courts to ignore anatomical classifi-
cations and determine a person's sex according to the psychological
makeup of that individual.""' Similarly, in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,4
the Seventh Circuit reversed a federal district court's determination
that Eastern Airlines had discriminated against a postoperative male-
to-female transsexual pilot who was fired after she returned to work
following sex-reassignment surgery, reiterating the now-familiar
statement that "Title VII does not protect transsexuals."''
On the heels of Ulane came Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
142
in which a preoperative male-to-female transsexual employed by Am-
trak informed supervisors that she was receiving hormone injections
to begin the sex-reassignment process and consequently experienced
undue employment hardships, 4' The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania stated that the "term 'sex' in Title VII refers
to an individual's distinguishing biological or anatomical characteris-
tics, whereas the term 'gender' refers to an individual's sexual iden-
tity.'' 4 The court also held that transsexualism was not a mental or
psychological disorder under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
because it was not a mental or psychological disorder "inherently
prone to limit major life activities.
Dobre was followed by James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc.,' 46 in
which a transsexual alleged sex and disability discrimination under
Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990;147 the James
court held that "[t]he Americans with Disabilities Act does not rec-
ognize transsexualism as a covered disability" as transsexualism "is a
condition which is specifically exempted from coverage.
' '141
139 Id. at 749.
140 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
141 Id. at 1084. Alter stating that "Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind when it passed
the Civil Rights Act, and it has rejected subsequent attempts to broaden the scope of its original
interpretation," the Seventh Circuit crudely opined that "it may be that society, as the trial
judge found, considers Ulane to be female ... but even if one believes that a woman can be so
easily created fiom what remains of a man, that does not decide the case." Id. at 1086. The
court ultimately concluded that "[i] t is clear from the evidence that if Eastern did discriminate
against Ulane, it was not because she is female, but because she is a transsexual." Id. at 1087.
142 850 F. Stipp. 284, 285-86 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
143 She was told that a doctor's note was needed for her to dress as a female, she was required
to dress as a male, she was not allowed to use the women's restroom, her supervisor referred to
her by her male name, and her desk was moved out of public view. Id. at 286.
M Id. at 286 (citing Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir.
1977)).
145 Id. at 289.
146 No. 94-2235-KHV, 1994 WL 731517, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994).
147 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1)(2002).
148 James, 1994 WL 731517, at *2.
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A different mood began to descend in 1989, when the Supreme
Court considered Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 involving a sex dis-
crimination claim brought by Hopkins, a female employee of Price
Waterhouse who had been denied a partnership because she needed
to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femin-
inely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."' 5° Justice
Brennan announced the court's holding that when a plaintiff in a Ti-
tle VII action proves that gender played a part in an employment de-
cision, the defendant employer may avoid a finding of liability by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made
the same decision regardless of the plaintiff's gender. Lest there be
any confusion over whether gender was actionable under Title VII,
Justice Brennan explicitly stated that "Congress' intent to forbid em-
ployers to take gender into account in making employment [deci-
sions] appears on the face of the [Title VII] statute," and interpreted
the statutory language forbidding employers from acting "in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities.., because of such individual's:., sex" to mean
"that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.'. 5
Likewise, in 1995 in Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc.,' 52 the New York
Supreme Court held that an employer violated a city anti-sex dis-
crimination ordinance by harassing an employee who changes sex
through surgery and hormone treatments. This mood was only
strengthened by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Schwenk v. Hartford,
153
in which a preoperative male-to-female transsexual sued a state prison
guard and other officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Gender
Motivated Violence Act ("GMVA")."4 The Ninth Circuit first summa-
rized the earlier approach to defining "sex" '' under Title VII before
rejecting this approach, choosing instead to rely upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 56 that Title VII barred
not just discrimination based on the fact that Hopkins was a woman,
but also discrimination based on the fact that Hopkins failed "to act
like a woman," "to conform to socially-constructed gender expecta-
149 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
150 Id. at 235.
151 Id. at 240.
152 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
IM 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
154 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
155 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201. The court stated that "federal courts (including this one) ini-
tially adopted the approach that sex is distinct from gender," and, as a result, "[mlale-to-female
transsexuals, as anatomical males whose outward behavior and inward identity did not meet the
social definitions of masculinity, were denied the protection of Title VII by these courts because
they were the victims of gender, rather than sex, discrimination." Id.
1% 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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tions."'' 57 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that, "under Price Water-
house, 'sex' under Title VII encompasses both sex-that is, the bio-
logical differences between men and women-and gender."18 As the
GMVA paralleled Title VII, "for purposes of these two acts, the terms
'sex' and 'gender' have become interchangeable."' 9
5. Anti-Cross-Dressing Ordinances and Transsexuals
Courts have long recognized that preoperative transsexuals who
must dress in the clothing of the opposite sex aspart of the "real life
test" requirement for sex-reassignment surgery may not be prose-
cuted under city ordinances forbidding citizens to dress as members
of the opposite sex. In City of Chicago v. Wilson,161 the Illinois Supreme
Court found that an anti-cross-dressing provision was "an unconstitu-
tional infringement of [defendants'] liberty interest[s]" and held that
the city's justifications for the provision did not apply to transsexuals
such as the defendants.'62  This approach was followed in Doe v.
McConn,6 3 a Texas case with a similar fact pattern.'C The court de-
termined that the anti-cross-dressing provision was unconstitutional
as applied to transsexuals because the "policies and procedures di-
rectly inhibit the treatment of the transsexual plaintiffs and their re-
assignment."""5 The most recent case to address the constitutionality
of an anti-cross-dressing regulation came in the rather surprising con-
text of a middle school."r' In Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits,"' the Superior
157 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201-02.
Id. at 1202.
159 Id.
See HARRY BENJAMIN, STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 73, at § 4.9.1.
161 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Il1. 1978).
I 2 d. at 525. Two preoperative male-to-female transsexuals were arrested for wearing female
clothing because they violated an anti-cross-dressing provision of the Chicago municipal code
which prohibited a person from wearing clothing of the opposite sex with an intent to conceal
his or her own sex. The court also stated that "we cannot assume that individuals who cross-
dress tor the purpose of therapy are prone to commit crimes," and reasoned that since "[t]here
is no evidence ... that cross-dressing, when done as part of a preoperative therapy program or
otherwise, is in and of itself, harmful to society," "the aesthetic preference of society must be
balanced against the individual's well being." Id. at 525.
489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
Preoperative transsexuals and a treating physician sought declaratory and injunctive relief
with regard to a Houston ordinance prohibiting a person from appearing in public dressed
"with an intent to disguise his or her true sex as that of the opposite sex." Id. at 79.
it ', Id. The court further determined that, for a transsexual, wearing the clothing of the op-
posite sex was "medically and psychologically necessary for the true integration of the body and
mind throughout the transition period of the developing gender." Id.
16 A fifteen-year-old student male-to-female preoperative transsexual brought an action re-
questing that her school not exclude her because of her sex, disability, gender identity, and ex-
pression.
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Court of Massachusetts not only found that "plaintiffs expression is
not merely a personal preference but a necessary symbol of her very
identity," but also held that the defendants were "enjoined from pre-
venting plaintiff from wearing any clothing or accessories that any
other male or female student could wear to school without being dis-
ciplined. """
6. Determining Whether Sex Reassignment
Surgery is "Medically Necessary"
Courts' determinations of whether sex-reassignment surgery was
"medically necessary" for transsexuals have serious repercussions not
only, in suits seeking reimbursement from Medicaid but also, in ac-
tions in which courts must assess the nature of transsexualism as a
disorder. In the landmark case Smith v. Rasmussen,""6 a female-to-male
postoperative transsexual filed suit seeking reimbursement from the
Iowa Medicaid program for sex-reassignment surgery after Medicaid
initially denied reimbursement on the grounds that the surgery was
experimental and not medically necessary. In denying a motion to
dismiss filed by the director of the Department of Human Services,
the court stated that sex-reassignment surgery was not experimental
but was generally accepted in the medical community and concluded
that "sex reassignment surgery cannot be excluded from Medicaid
coverage on the ground that it is 'experimental.""7'
7. The Rights of Transsexual Prisoners
In Meriwether v. Faulkner, 17 the most frequently cited case dealing
with a preoperative transsexual prisoner's right to receive medical
167 No. 00-1060-A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), affd, Doe v.
Brockton School Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30,
2000).
IC Id. at *3, *8. The language of the opinion seems to imply that the transsexual plaintiff has
some sort of interest in her appearance; as the court stated, "[t]his court cannot allow the sti-
fling of plaintiff's selfhood merely because it causes some members of the commtuntity discom-
fort." Id. at *7.1 W 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
170 Id. at 770.
171 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff in this case was a preoperative male-to-female
transsexual who had received nine years of estrogen therapy, who had surgical augmentation of
breasts, hips, and facial structure, and who had been living as a female since the age of fourteen
was treated as an anatomical male during her incarceration. The transsexual received no hor-
mone treatments and no medical treatment for problems relating to silicon breast implants, was
confined to segregated protective custody, and while in the general male prison poptlation was
harassed and sexually assaulted. As a result of this treatment the transsexual filed suit, alleging
that prison officials had violated her Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. See
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treatment while incarcerated, the Seventh Circuit stated that to pre-
vail the plaintiff must establish "deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs."' ' The court also emphasized that "other courts have
recognized transsexualism as a 'very complex medical and psycho-
logical problem,"' noting that courts have held that sex-reassignment
surgery is not cosmetic but medically necessary. 73 The Seventh Cir-
cuit ultimately held that the transsexual's complaint stated a serious
medical need and a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment which,
if proven, would entitle her to some kind of medical treatment. 174
The court emphasized, however, that "she does not have a right to
any particular type of treatment, such as estrogen therapy," noting
that the only two federal courts to have considered the issue refused
to recognize a constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to
estrogen therapy if some alternative treatment is made available.' 75 A
later Supreme Court case, Farmer v. Brennan,176 articulated the stan-
dard that transsexuals must satisfy in order to establish that a depriva-
tion or prison officials' egregious conduct constitutes an Eighth
Amendment violation. The Supreme Court held that in order to vio-
late the Eighth Amendment, prison officials' conduct must meet two
requirements: the deprivation alleged must be sufficiently serious,
and an official must have a state of mind that amounts to "'deliberate
indifference' to inmate health or safety.'
177
At least one court has required that an inmate's failure to cooper-
ate with prison officials in the treatment of her gender dysphoria
does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. The "deliber-
ate indifference" standard articulated by the Supreme Court was ap-
plied in Long v. Nix,' vs where the Eighth Circuit held that Long could
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. After the district court dismissed her complaint, she appealed, and
the Seventh Circuit reversed.
72 Id. at 411 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
73 Id. at 412.
174 Id. at 413.
175 Id., (discussing Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F.
Sups.. 351 (D. Kan. 1986)).
. 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In Farmer, a male-to-female preoperative transsexual who had un-
derwent estrogen therapy, received breast implants, and underwent unsuccessful testicle re-
moval surgery was incarcerated and diagnosed by prison medical personnel as a transsexual;
while imprisoned, she wore clothes in a feminine manner and allegedly took hormones smug-
gled into the prison and was segregated from the male prison population because of miscon-
duct and safety concerns. After being transferred to another penitentiary for disciplinary rea-
sons, she was placed in the general male population and was beaten and raped by a fellow
inmate in a cell. Farmer filed suit, alleging that officials had placed her in the general popula-
tion knowing that she was a transsexual and was vulnerable to assault and so deliberately failed
to protect her safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302-03 (1991)).
178 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996). A 61-year old male inmate with gender identity disorder who
had cross-dressed since an early age requested to be housed in a women's prison, to wear
women's clothes, and to receive therapy and a sex change; the inmate claimed that prison offi-
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not establish that prison officials were "deliberately indifferent" to his
needs as he had "long frustrated the attempts of prison doctors to
treat that disorder by his consistent refusal of psychological evalua-
tion over the past twenty years."''
Finally, at least one court has held that transsexual prisoners
should receive continuing medical treatment while incarcerated. In
Wolfe v. Horn, the District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia held that "abrupt termination of prescribed hormonal treatments
by a prison official with no understanding of Wolfe's condition, and
failure to treat her severe withdrawal symptoms of after-effects, could
constitute 'deliberate indifference.""8
Prison officials often adopt a policy of "freezing" transsexual pris-
oners in the prescribed treatment which they were undergoing prior
to incarceration; thus, individuals involved in a physician-prescribed
hormone therapy regimen would be permitted to continue this
treatment while those persons taking black market hormones would
not.1l An extremely recent case may raise the stakes for the provision
of medical treatment to incarcerated transsexuals. In Kosilek v. Ma-
loney, a transsexual serving a life sentence brought suit to compel
Commissioner Maloney of the Massachusetts Department of Correc-
tions to retain a doctor specializing in Gender Identity Disorder and
provide prescribed treatments. While the court did not address the
question of which treatment the Commissioner was obligated to pro-
vide, it did state that it "expects that Maloney will allow qualified
medical professionals to recommend treatment. [A] t a minimum
psychotherapy with... a professional with training and experience
concerning an individual with severe GID."'
8 2
cials had violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide appropriate living conditions
and medical treatment and the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to accommodate his gender
identity disorder.
17 Id. at 766.
180 130 F. Supp. 2d 648, 653 (E.D. Pa. 2001). In Wolfe, a male-to-female preoperative trans-
sexual who was receiving hormone therapy and antidepressants at the time of her arrest was
incarcerated and continued to receive treatment; after she was transferred to a second and a
third facility where her treatment was discontinued, she brought suit against prison officials al-
leging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and malpractice. The court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgement, stating that "[w]hen a prisoner has received
medical attention and merely questions its adequacy, courts hesitate to second-guess profes-
sional judgements under the guise of the Eighth Amendment" and so "have rejected demands
for hormonal therapy by transsexuals who did not take hormones outside of the prison setting."
Id. at 652.
181 See Kosilek v. Maloney, No. CIV.A.92-12820-MLW, 2002 WIL 1997932, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug.
28, 2002).
1 Id. at *10. The court further stated that if hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery
were ultimately needed, the Commissioner would have to consider whether security issues
would make it impossible "to provide medically adequate care in prison for Kosilek's serious
medical need." Id. at *5.
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III. ARTICULATING A LIBERTY INTEREST IN SELF-DEFINITION
With a comprehensive understanding of the judicial treatment of
transsexualism and its implications in various legal contexts, it is now
possible to understand how transsexuals possess only a few limited in-
terests, including a liberty interest in dressing in the self-identified
sex for therapeutic purposes and a limited right to receive some form
of continuing medical treatment for transsexualism while incarcer-
ated. These limited interests, while by no means insignificant, do not
arise in an everyday context for the majority of transsexuals, espe-
cially for postoperative transsexuals who no longer need to dress in
the self-identified sex for therapeutic reasons. Clearly, then, trans-
sexuals still lack the most important liberty interests, and so it is nec-
essary to articulate new liberty interests to ensure that legal determi-
nations of sex are respected so that transsexuals are finally placed on
equal constitutional footing with nontranssexuals.
As previously stated, a liberty interest in self-identification has not
yet been articulated, but this does not mean that such an interest can
not be articulated or that it will never be articulated. If such an in-
terest were to be enumerated, it would most likely emanate from at
least one of three possible sources: an equal protection argument
that transsexuals are a suspect class, an equal protection argument
that transsexuals have a fundamental right to self-identify their legal
sex, or a due process decision birthed from the long line of privacy
cases establishing the oft-quoted "right to be left alone" first articu-o. . 18"3
lated by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States.
A. The Potential of Privacy
In the two major precursors to modern privacy jurisprudence,
Meyer v. Nebraska8 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 187 the Supreme Court
used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
down state statutes prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in
elementary schools and requiring that all children attend public
schools, respectively. Neither case explicitly articulated a right to
"privacy" as such. Further enumeration on a potential right to pri-
vacy came in the unlikely guise of Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman.""' Harlan asserted that national tradition should be a guide
lF. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (reviewing convictions of conspiracy based on tapped telephones that
were tapped offsite of the defendant's property).
184 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
IM 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
I; 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (challenging the constitutionality of a prohi-
bition on contraceptive devices). Here, Harlan recognized that due process "has represented
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for due process decisionmaking, emphasizing that tradition is not
static but a fluid "living thing" that includes both "what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the tradi-
tions from which it broke."'87 The right to privacy was first explicitly
enumerated by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut." In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,' Justice Brennan continued what Griswold began,
holding that under the Equal Protection Clause the privacy right was
located in the individual and not in the marital unibn itself as Gris-
wold seemed to suggest.19  The majority opinion delivered by Justice
Blackmun in Roe v. Wade9' permanently located privacy in the Due
Process Clause's protection of liberty, where Justice Harlan first
placed it in his Poe dissent 9' However, the borders of individual pri-
vacy were erected in Bowers v. Hardwick,' in which Justice White ex-
cluded the possibility of a right to privacy that extended to homosex-
ual sodomy, limiting prior privacy cases to narrow classifications. 194
White also enumerated "the nature of the rights qualifying for
heightened judicial protection," namely those "fundamental liberties
that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' and liberties
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."
Nonetheless, considerable wiggle room exists to articulate a pri-
vacy right allowing for self-identification of legal sex. The same pri-
vate "zone of interest" that prevents state infringement upon some
forms of intimate decisionmaking could extend to protect transsexu-
als' ability to self-identify their own sex. Bowers does not speak to
whether transsexuals have a privacy right to self-identify their legal
sex as it addresses a specific sexual practice in the context of a homo-
the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual,
has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society." Id. at 542.
187 Id.
188 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (reversing the conviction of medical professionals for dispensing
birth control to married couples). Here, justice Douglas stated that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance," and asserted that additional penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and their "[v]arious guarantees" created additional "zone[s] of
privacy." Id. at 484.
18 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See also id. at 453 ("[l]t is the right of the individual, married or sin-
gle, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamental ... as the
decision to bear or beget a child.").
190 Id.
191 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
192WILLAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 33
(1997).
193 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
194 Id. at 190. white stated that Pierce and Meyer "were described as dealing with child rearing
and education," Griswold and Eisenstadt "with contraception," and Roe v. Wade "with abortion."
Id.
Id. at 191-92, (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)); see also Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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sexual sexual orientation, not sex or gender as fundamental charac-
teristics of personhood. However, the dissenting opinions of Justices
Blackmun and Stevens both speak to the universal importance of
sexual identity,'° and Justice Stevens' dissent provides much fertile
ground for such a privacy right. If it is true that "[f]rom the stand-
point of the individual, the homosexual and the heterosexual have
the same interest in deciding how he will live his own life, and, more
narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary
associations with his companions," then how much more so does a
transsexual have the right to choose her own legal sex, an essential
characteristic of personhood?'9 ' Rights must inhere in individuals
simply because they are individual citizens, irrespective of their sexual
identity. Rights must arise from personhood, not from sexuality.
Bowers sounded the death knell for claims to privacy in the form of
individual autonomy to engage in all forms of sexual acts. In Su-
preme Court privacy jurisprudence, therefore, privacy has been nar-
rowed to "an essentially conservative idea or value, used in the service
of powerful interests to reinforce traditionally condoned relation-
ships and forms of intimacy."' 8 In order to articulate a privacy right
to self-identification for transsexuals, then, privacy could be recon-
structed as a "liberatory value," protecting the individual, not the in-
dividual's relations with others." Bowers, however, implies that such a
rearticulation would not be favorably received by the majority of Jus-
tices on the Supreme Court. Getting past this "relational" reading of
privacy and recapturing the former emphasis on privacy as an indi-
vidual right necessitates us to distinguish between Bowers' focus on
sodomy as intimate behavior shared by two people and an individ-
ual's status as a transsexual trapped between sex and gender. Bowers
focuses on sodomy reconstructed as a dyadic relational behavior.
Transsexualism, on the other hand, is a status, not a behavior, that
takes place in a unitary, or individual, context. The identity of trans-
sexualism itself, therefore, may provide a way around the behav-
ior/relational conundrum articulated in Bowers. Transsexualism is a
condition of the self, primarily affecting an individual's self identity as
it conflicts with that individual's anatomy. Therefore, the focus may
properly be moved from a relational to an individual perspective,
from the sexual intimacy shared by two or more people to the one's
own unique sexual identity or gender. It is important to realize that
courts could not avoid this issue by focusing on transsexual sex acts
196 Id. at 205 (citing Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
197 Id. at 218-19. After all, as Stevens correctly asserts, "[s]tate intrusion into the private con-
duct of either is equally burdensome." Id. at 219.
198 PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACYAND THE POLITICS OF INTIMATE LIFE 103 (1996).
199 Id.
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because postoperative transsexuals engage in heterosexual sex; sod-
omy is not a "transsexual" sex act any more than it is a "heterosexual"
sex act.
To further this individualized focus, emphasis should be placed
on medicalization of transsexualism. Medical problems experienced
by an individual become dilemmas of the autonomous body, of one's
Self, not of the Other. A strong analogy could be made between the
unique, medicalized situation of transsexuals and the highly medical-
ized situation of a pregnant Jane Roe in Roe v. Wade. Though cases
from Griswold forward legitimated the medicalization of contracep-
tion distribution and availability, this medicalization of intimate deci-
sionmaking culminated in Roe, where the Supreme Court defined the
state's interest in potential life "physiologically, without reference to
the sorts of constitutional considerations that normally attend the use
of state power against a citizen," and thus analyzed "an exercise of
state power from a medical, rather than a social, point of view."' ° Just
as the "facts concerning the physiological development of the unborn
provide 'logical and biological justifications' both limiting and le-
gitimating state action," so can the physiological dimensions of trans-
sexualism as a medical disorder legitimate a state's decision to allow
transsexuals to control their own autonomous bodies by self-
identifying their legal sex within certain articulated limits. 20'
All in all, under current jurisprudence privacy is not conceptually
the most effective means of articulating a right for transsexuals to
self-identify their legal sex. Drawing attention to transsexualism as a
conflict between an individual's internal gender and external sexual
organs emphasizes the individual nature of the disorder and so por-
trays transsexualism as a condition disembodied from society, an af-
fliction of the few that in no way affects the many. Casting transsex-
ualism as a "personal dilemma or matter of one's privacy rights rather
than as a systemic dilemma which can be addressed through collec-
tive action is disempowering to the individual coping with the di-
lemma, and depoliticizing and dangerous to the polity that closes off
important problems from consideration by declaring them 'pri-
vate. " In addition, it is doubtful that articulating a privacy interest
to self-identification would address the significant political and cul-
tural obstacles encountered by pre- and postoperative transsexuals.2 °3
2W Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Ques-
tions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 276 (1992).
201 Id.
W2 BOLING, supra note 198, at 104.
20. See id. at 105. Here, Boling emphasizes that "[a]cceptance, and self-acceptance" of trans-
sexualism requires "the uncovering and confronting of prejudices and forms of social power,
the acknowledgement and appreciation of differences in public as well as private, not the pre-
tense of assimilation and passing that privacy promotes." Id. at 104-05.
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As Boling advocates with respect to articulating a privacy interest re-
garding homosexuality,
[p] rotecting privacy would not help us recognize that the ""'freedom to
have impact on others-to make the 'statement' implicit in a public iden-
tity-is central to any adequate conception of the self"" or help to allay
"'pervasive discrimination... ' in public society; it would not itself con-
tribute, nor would it directly empower its beneficiaries to contribute, to
'heightening public awareness of [transsexuality] and thus broaden pub-
lic acceptance of [these] lifestyles.
' '20
4
The overall effect of articulating such a privacy interest would likely
"burden" transsexuality with the "'stigma of quarantine."'05 This is
not to say that transsexuals would be better off without an articulated
privacy interest, but that such an interest would have to be carefully
articulated so as not to further marginalize those it is supposed to
benefit.
If we are to continue our quest for recognition of a privacy right
to sexual self-identification, we must recast the current conception of
privacy in a different mold. The present notion of privacy is a nega-
tive bar against certain intrusions into an individual's zone of privacy.
Under a positive conception of privacy centered on the concept of
personhood, emphasizing individual autonomy and dignity, one
could argue that the right of transsexuals to self-define their legal sex
should receive constitutional protection because it is so essential to
an individual's concept of self. 2 6 Such a rearticulation of privacy in-
' Id. at 105 (citations omitted).
2% Id.
2W For an example of how privacy promotes personhood, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419, 1468-69 (1991):
These privacy concepts have two benefits for advocating the reproductive rights of
women of color in particular: the right of privacy stresses the value of personhood, and it
protects against the totalitarian abuse of government power. First, affirming Black
women's constitutional claim to personhood is particularly important because these
women historically have been denied the dignity of their full humanity and identity. The
principle of self-definition has special significance for Black women. Angela Harris rec-
ognizes in the writings of Zora Neale Hurston an insistence on a "conception of identity
as a construction, not an essence .... [Bllack women have had to learn to construct
themselves in a society that denied them ftll selves." Black women's willful self-
definition is an adaptation to a history of social denigration. Rejected from the domi-
nant society's norm of womanhood, Black women have been forced to resort to their
own internal resources. Harris contrasts this process of affirmative self-definition with the
feminist paradigm of women as passive victims. Black women willfully create their own
identities out of "fragments of experience, not discovered in one's body or unveiled after
male domination is eliminated." The concept of personhood embodied in the right of
privacy can be used to affirm the role of will and creativity in Black women's construction
of their own identities. Relying on the concept of self-definition celebrates the legacy of
Black women who have survived and transcended conditions of oppression.
While fundamentally different in their history of oppression and the ways in which
they have been marginalized, transsexuals clearly have a status analogous to that of Black
women; transsexuals too have been denied dignity, full humanity, and indeed a coherent
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volves correctly emphasizing transsexuality as an issue concerning
sexual identity. As Jed Rubenfield rationalizes, "differences of sexual-
ity, gender, and race exist among us. These are not, however, differ-
ences in identity until we make them so." Sex and gender are core
components of everyone's conception of self, not only that of trans-
sexuals. Therefore, it is imperative that we forego a blind and unin-
formed biologically-motivated focus on the transsexual as a sexual de-
viant in favor of a more body-oriented focus centered on the
importance of sexual identity to every citizen.
The danger in this perspective is again that the very focus on indi-
vidualism limits the degree to which such a person-oriented approach
could take root. By focusing on individuals, we focus on individual
characteristics, and transsexualism, not sex or gender identity per se,
is once again elevated as a foremost concern. Using transsexualism as
a rallying point is "problematic" in that it exposes "the individual to
normalizing pressures on her intimate expression," treating her
transsexuality as her "defining political trait." '  Paradoxically, in fo-
cusing on transsexualism we reach injustice in a quest to achieve jus-
tice because such a focus portrays sexual identity as the only identity;
it is "as if one's sexual identity were one's identity as a citizen and as a
,,209
person.
Clearly, then, making personal traits political has some pitfalls.
Because "sexual identity is one aspect, and not always the most im-
portant one, of a person's whole self,'210 what is needed is a "way to
recognize and articulate problems first experienced in private or in
isolation from others.., not as a problem of personal biogra-
phy..., but as systemic problems that affect many or most people in
the same situation., 21  Broadening the classification of transsexualism
as an issue of sexual identity by framing it as an issue of gender ne-
gates the focus on individual identity and does not reduce identity to
its sexual aspect. Gender as a series of personal strategies can give
rise to a series of political strategies as well. A gendered focus redi-
rects our attention to a universal human characteristic; we all experi-
ence gender in different ways, and the socialization of our gender
(or perhaps any normalized) sexual identity. Transsexuals have adapted by passing while
creating their own identities. Affirming the personhood of transsexuals recognizes the
community's active resistance of marginalization and the "will and creativity" with which
they have persevered in the fight for constitutional rights.
207 Jed Rubenfield, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 781 (1989).
BOUNG, supra note 198, at 142.
Id. Ultimately, "[b]y conceiving of the conduct that it purports to protect as 'essential to
the individual's identity,' personhood inadvertently reintroduces into privacy analysis the very
premise of the invidious uses of state power it seeks to overcome." Rubenfield, supra note 207,
at 782.
210 BOLING, supra note 198, at 143.
21 Id. at 153.
Oct. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
experiences groups us into subgroups. Those of us whose gender
situational subgroup is the socialized "norm" are heterosexual indi-
viduals whose gender comports with anatomical sex. Others of us are
homosexual individuals whose gender comports with anatomical sex,
bisexual individuals whose gender comports with anatomical sex, or
transsexual individuals whose gender does not comport with ana-
tomical sex. Seen in this light, transsexualism becomes merely a situ-
ational subgroup of people who experience gender in the same way,
not a factor that differentiates the holistic notion of "me" from the
holistic notion of "you." From this perspective, then, there is not
"one" gender experience elevated above "other" deviant gender ex-
periences; many diverse gender experiences share the floor, some
normalized through socialization, some normalized in certain con-
texts, and some not normalized at all. There is no bar, however, on
normalization; other gender experiences are being and can continue
to be normalized through exposure, education, and the like.
B. The Potential of Equal Protection
The law does not recognize a fundamental right to identify one's
legal sex, perhaps because only a small minority ever have the occa-
sion to assert such a right. A fundamental right extends to all per-
sons, not just to a certain subsection of the population. Nontrans-
sexuals have their legal sex identified for them at birth, and, because
their gender comports with their anatomical sex, never question this
identification. Therefore, without transsexualism as a motivating fac-
tor, no legitimate impetus giving rise to a fundamental right of self-
identification would exist.
Setting aside the question of a fundamental right, we may now
turn to the issue of suspect class. Thus far, transsexuals have not
been held to be a suspect class for equal protection purposes."'
However, this determination was made upon an analysis of transsexu-
als as a class, not upon an analysis of gender as a suspect classifica-
tion. In holding that transsexuals were not a suspect class and thus
undeserving of heightened scrutiny under an equal protection analy-
sis, the Ninth Circuit in Holloway stated that "we find that transsexuals
are not ... a 'discrete and insular minority,"' that "[it has not] been
established that transsexuality is an 'immutable characteristic deter-
mined solely by the accident of birth.'- 1 3 This approach to the issue
of self-identification, however, is misguided. The issue should be
phrased not as whether transsexuals as a class should be treated as
21 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977).
213 Id. at 663. The Ninth Circuit further stated that "the complexities involved merely in de-
fining the term 'transsexual' would prohibit a determination of suspect classification." Id.
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suspect under an equal protection analysis, but whether gender as a
classification should be elevated to suspect status. Instead of debating
whether transsexuals are a discrete and insular minority, or whether
transsexualism is an immutable characteristic, the argument should
focus on gender as a classification inscribed on the bodies of all citi-
zens, not just transsexuals, a classification that many courts have al-
ready decreed is deserving of special protection. Of course, in this
sense, gender is disaggregated from biological sex.
Possible models for articulating gender as a classification deserv-
ing of heightened scrutiny may be found in Title VII cases in which
courts have held that "sex" in the meaning of Title VII includes "gen-
der" as well.21 4 In Price Waterhouse,21 5 Justice Brennan emphasized that
including gender as part of "sex" for purposes of Title VII is not a
new interpretation: "our assumption always has been that if an em-
ployer allows gender to affect its decision-making process, then it
must carry the burden of justifying its ultimate decision. ' F, Such pro-
tection against gender discrimination has already been extended to
preoperative transsexuals in the context of Title VII. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held in Schwenk v. Hartford"7 that discrimination against a male-
to-female preoperative transsexual falls within "gender" discrimina-
tion under the Gender Motivated Violence Act, which paralleled Title
VII. According to this interpretation of "sex," "male-to-female trans-
sexuals, as anatomical males whose outward behavior and inward
identity did not meet social definitions of masculinity," are thus as de-
serving of protection against gender discrimination through sex-
stereotyping as Hopkins was in Price Waterhouse.
The fact that courts have held that "sex" under Title VII includes
one's gender prompts us to realize the possibility of arguing that, like
sex, gender should receive heightened scrutiny under an equal pro-
tection analysis. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 1 8 the distinction between
classes and classifications became blurred when Justice Brennan
enunciated why sex should receive heightened scrutiny using the fac-
tors219 articulated under the traditional indicia of suspectness first al-
214 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion); Schwenk v.
Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
215 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
216 Id. at 248. Price Waterhouse is also particularly relevant as it deals not only with issues of
gender discrimination, but more specifically with sex stereotyping, or making determinations
on how an individual should act on the basis of her gender. For example, "an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has
acted on the basis of gender" in a sex-stereotyping context. Id. at 250.
217 204 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000).
218 411 U.S. 677, 683-87 (1973).
219 These factors include whether a class is "saddled with disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
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luded to in United States v. Carolene Products Co.20 Brennan stated that
"sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic, de-
termined solely by the accident of birth" and that "the sex character-
istic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society.,21 Brennan further noted that "over the past decade, Con-
gress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classi-
fications.",
2
In Watkins v. United States Army,"'2 the Ninth Circuit applied these
same factors in finding that homosexuals constituted a suspect class.
Even though this initial decision was reversed en banc in the following
year, 4 the Ninth's Circuit's reasoning and application of suspect class
criteria remains noteworthy. The Watkins court considered factors
routinely utilized in Supreme Court jurisprudence, including consid-
erations of purposeful discrimination involving gross unfairness, 
225
which is determined by considering factors such as the trait's impact
upon performance and immutability. 2 2' Perhaps Watkins' most sig-
nificant jurisprudential contribution is defining what traits are immu-
table. In discussing the immutability of homosexuality, the Ninth
Circuit first stated that immutability was not in and of itself a defining
criterion.2 7 Watkins also distinguished among three different types of
immutability: "'strict' immutability, in which the bearer must be un-
able to change the trait; 'effective' immutability, in which changing
the trait is possible but difficult; and 'personhood' immutability, in
which the bearer's ability to change the trait is irrelevant, as long as it
is central to her identity."28 According to Watkins, strict immutability
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
=0 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that judicial intervention to protect discrete and
insular minorities is more appropriate the less power they have in the political process).
' Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
I d. at 687.
223 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
24 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
2 5 847 F.2d at 1345-46. Explicitly, these factors include "whether the group at issue has suf-
fered a history of ptrposeful discrimination" and "whether the discrimination embodies a gross
unfairness that is sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to term it invidi-
Otis." Id.
226 Id. at 1346. Factors for determining gross unfairness are listed as "whether the disadvan-
taged class is defined by a trait that 'frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society,"' "whether the class has been saddled with unique disabilities because of
prejudice or inaccurate stereotypes," and "whether the trait defining the class is immutable."
ld.
I27 Id. at 1347 ("The Supreme Court has never held that only classes with immutable traits
can be deemed suspect.").
28 Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 494 (1998).
[Vol. 5:1
LA WAS A REMYECTION OF HER/HIS-STORY
2211has only a limited usefulness. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit opted
for a less strict formulation of personhood immutability.2
Extending the aforementioned indicia of suspect classes to gender
as a suspect classification is not in the least problematic. Gender
characteristics are highly visible for transsexuals just as sex character-
istics are for women, and indeed, are even more so, for the inconsis-
tencies between internal gender and external sex organs that charac-
terize transsexuals heightens the visibility of transsexuals' sex and
gender characteristics and transforms matters of everyday life such as
which restroom to use into unique and crucial issues. In addition,
gender is an immutable characteristic, as the Supreme Court stated
in Parham v. Hughes;31 its immutability is simply not often considered
by those whose gender is harmonized with anatomical sex. Such in-
dividuals do not confront the fact that gender cannot be changed be-
cause they do not seek to change it. Transsexuals have learned, how-
ever, that while gender cannot be changed, sex can. Thus, in
addition to seemingly constituting a strictly immutable characteristic,
the immutability of gender is also ensured under the Watkins stan-
dard of "personhood" immutability; gender is certainly a trait that is
so fundamental to one's identity that it cannot be changed, only de-
nied, and it would be "abhorrent" to suggest that one deny one's
gender. Refusing to permit any transsexual to self-identify her legal
sex is tantamount to penalizing that transsexual for refusing to
change her gender. Gender is also not related to one's ability to per-
form or contribute to society. Finally, courts have shown increasing
V.) Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1347. ("[T]he Court has never meant strict immutability in the sense
that members of the class must be physically unable to change or mask the trait defining their
class," using transsexualism as an example in that "people can have operations to change their
sex.").
,10 Id. Personhood immutability "may describe those traits that are so central to a person's
identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change
them." Id.
V 1 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (holding that (1) a Georgia statute-which precluded a father who
did not legitimate his child from suing for that child's wrongful death-did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause when it imposed differing burdens or awarded differing benefits to
legitimate and illegitimate children; (2) the statute was not invidiously discriminatory against
males; (3) the statutory classification was a rational means of dealing with problem of proving
paternity; and (4) the statute did not violate the Due Process Clause). Parham described race,
national origin, age, illegitimacy, and gender as immutable:
And the presumption of statutory validity may also be undermined when a State has en-
acted legislation creating classes based upon certain other immutable human attributes.
See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (ille-
gitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender).
Id. at 35 1.
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sensitivity to gender-based classifications, and have even expanded
"sex" to include "gender" in Title VII litigation. 32
Using gender as a suspect classification may seem like a back-door
approach to establishing that transsexuals are a suspect class. How-
ever, this is not so, as transsexuals are a unique group whose gender
is inconsistent with anatomical sex. Clearly, transsexuals' need to ar-
ticulate their legal sex and gender must not only be recognized as be-
ing distinct from that of nontranssexuals, but also must be addressed
separately from the concerns of the nontranssexual population whose
gender is not incongruent with anatomical sex.
C. Articulating a Potential Liberty Interest
The previous section detailed many constitutional strategies by
which a liberty interest in legal sex self-definition could be articu-
lated. It is now necessary to identify the more concrete legal vehicles
though which any such liberty interest should be recognized and ar-
ticulated. This requires a careful balancing of two equally competing
considerations: the transsexuals' interest in equity and privacy and
the legal need for consistency, objectivity, and an articulated standard
for decisionmaking. Three possible paths to articulating a potential
liberty interest readily suggest themselves. First, courts could adopt a
uniform policy of self-definition, allowing all preoperative and post-
operative transsexuals to self-define their legal sex. Second, courts
could reject the idea of a transsexual liberty interest in self-
identification, and consider numerous factors as in In re Estate of Gar-
diner when making a decision as to an individual's sex, including but
not limited to "gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, external mor-
phologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotype sex, assigned sex and gender
of rearing, and sexual identity," in addition to chromosomal
makeup.13 ' Finally, as they have in the past,2 , courts could adopt an
entirely objective approach to defining legal sex, where a transsex-
ual's sex would be defined as the anatomical sex of that individual at
birth.
In order to realize the strengths and shortcomings of each of
these approaches, it is necessary to consider each in the context of
sex and gender. The concept of "sex" is never merely an issue of
anatomy and biology, but is comprised of and subject to a host of
other cultural and sociological factors. The dominant paradigm of
232 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that gender may not
be a motivating factor in an employment decision in a Title VII case); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
' 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
"M See, e.g., Corbett v. Corbett., 2 All E.R. 33 (P. 1970) (finding respondent to be male be-
cause he was a biological male from birth for purposes of declaring a marriage void).
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sex determination, however, still provides that "anatomy is destiny
without possibility of change or transcendence. 235 As we have already
seen that sex as a meta-concept is based on socio-cultural factors just
as much as it is based on biology, it follows that "it is the social con-
struction of the body and its meaning that is the primary source of
enslavement," not merely a body's anatomical characteristics.2'6 Thus,
though it absolutely should not, the "biological body dictates the so-
cial ascription of gender from birth to the grave from which the
transsexual psyche struggles to be free." 3' The very nature of trans-
sexualism proves that that mysterious and somewhat enigmatic com-
ponent of sex known as "gender" is separate from anatomical sex,
and indeed has the potential to directly oppose anatomical sex. If
gender was merely a function of sex, then transsexualism could never
exist, for gender could never be divergent from anatomical sex. Most
significantly, it is impossible to deny that the transsexual's plight is
unfortunately eloquent testimony to the heartbreaking and life-
rending consequences that arise because an individual's gender is not
dictated by anatomical sex alone. These factors compel us to recog-
nize not only that sex and gender are separate constructs, but also
that it is perfectly plausible for anatomical sex and gender to diverge,
and therefore that equity demands that the law go far beyond mere
anatomical characteristics in determining the legal sex of a transsex-
ual by considering sex and gender together. However, we must also
recognize that the law has a very real interest in consistency, objectiv-
ity, and accuracy in determining an individual's permanent legal sex
for purposes such as official recordkeeping and determining eligibil-
ity for a marriage license.
Currently, transsexual legal advocates "insist that they have the
need and right to determine their own gender." '  However, adopt-
ing an entirely subjective approach of allowing both preoperative and
postoperative transsexuals to self-identify their own sex is a highly
problematic solution to the conundrum of defining legal sex. While
this certainly is a very equitable approach for transsexuals, this is an
unsteady locus for the law as it undermines consistency, objectivity,
and accuracy. If courts allowed all transsexuals to self-define their le-
gal sex, then at what point would a transsexual become for all intents
and purposes a member of her self-identified sex? Would it be at the
moment of diagnosis? Would it be after the transsexual has begun
hormonal therapy? Or would it be after sex-reassignment surgery has
been completed, and a transsexual has the genitalia and secondary
235 EDWARDS, supra note 11, at 10.
2%Id.
237 Id.
M Weiss, supra note 40, at 168.
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sex characteristics of his or her self-identified sex? The difficulty in
pinpointing an exact moment when one "is" legally a member of
one's self-identified sex is indeed daunting.
In addition, allowing preoperative transsexuals to self-define their
legal sex would ironically overemphasize the importance of gender in
relation to anatomical sex. It is readily apparent that sex and gender
are two separate concepts that together determine an individual's sex-
ual identity. A preoperative female-to-male transsexual's external
female genitalia certainly affect her sexual identity simply because
they conflict with her internal male gender. Allowing her to self-
identify as a male would legally harmonize a severe physical and psy-
chological conflict between sex and gender, a conflict which perhaps
should first be resolved by sex-reassignment surgery.
Recalling the discussion of social constructivistperspectives on sex
and sexual identity and the body-as-text in Part I, 2 powerful grounds
for rejecting an entirely subjective self-identification policy exist that
emerge out of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity it-
self. We have seen that a subjective theoretical explication of sex and
gender is a powerful tool for elucidating the natures of and relation-
ship between the subjective and the objective. Although such an ap-
proach clearly applies in the realm of the theoretical, in practice its
productivity and utility wither away. Currently, the practices of con-
structivist scholars (likened to the subjective) and those of judges
(likened to the objective) are at cross purposes; the need for consis-
tency and order in the law limits the applicability of the subjective
approach in contemporary jurisprudence. Constructivist scholars
who are at home in the realm of the subjective are familiar with the
very same social theory of sign, discourse, and text that we explicated
earlier. Because they are aware of the inner workings of the same so-
cial theory, they know that they are reading, interpreting, and re-
constructing sign, text, and discourse. Scholarship requires its mem-
bers to consciously manipulate sign, text, and discourse in a manner
that only those familiar with the existence and principles of theoreti-
cal tools can do. Constructivist scholars are aware of these workings
on a theoretical level, on an abstract plane divorced from the tangi-
ble physical plane. The theoretical nature of the "reality" of subjec-
tivity is not that "reality" in which we live; it is an ideational reality of
Platonic forms.
Judges, however, must embrace and solve disputes that arise in the
practical physical world and must take signs, text, and discourses for
what they are-dress, mannerisms, people, ideologies-and interpret
them in almost all instances without the theoretical awareness of the
TV See supra Part I.
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nature of that interpretation. Judges confront sign, text, and dis-
course with the interpretive baggage that comes from social experi-
ences in the life-world, but without the theoretical semiotic baggage
that scholars lug around as sense-making tools of the trade. Judges
assign sex and gender to transsexual parties much as we assign sex
and gender to persons we meet, albeit in a more articulated and rea-
soned manner. As Susan Etta Keller emphasizes, "when making de-
terminations regarding the gender claims of litigants, judges are in-
volved in a process similar to everyday gender attribution-the
method by which we continuously decide whether someone is male
or female."2 4 Surely it would be impractical for all judges to be
trained in such theoretical manners before they assumed the bench.
Therefore, judges' capacity for conscious manipulation of sign, text,
and discourse is much smaller than that of the scholar adept at such
semiotic sculpture. Moreover, when judges determine an individual's
sex for purposes of marriage or a change of sex on a birth certificate,
they are not making a determination of what sex that individual is so-
cially constructed as, but a factual determination of anatomical sex.
Therefore, the inquiry is reduced to biological sex and does not in-
volve the theoretical metaconcept of sex that entails a biological
nexus and the interplay of the biological and the social. As such,
judges need not and most do not even enter the theoretical realm of
the subjective to make determinations of sex that are usually based
on objective, independently verifiable criteria such as chromosomcs
and external genitalia.
Additionally, if judges make determinations of legal sex in much
the same manner as each of us interprets and attributes gender to
strangers we encounter each day,2 41 they are just as vulnerable to ig-
norance and the stereotypes and stigmatizations that surround the
transsexual as other laymen. Transsexualism is not an issue that con-
fronts the average legal practitioner, and is most often relegated to
the outskirts of social awareness as a deviant or freakish form of sexu-
ality. Instances of discrimination against transsexuals, if people have
heard of them at all, are not as familiar as claims of discrimination
based on race or sex. Most people never stop to consider the every-
day struggles that transsexuals overcome and the pervasive discrimi-
nation and bias they must endure; those who do confront them in a
context that is at the very least fraught with heteronormativity and
perhaps moral baggage as well. Thus far, judges have been able to
utilize their discretion in determining legal sex, and there exists very
little consensus of opinion on exactly how to make such determina-
240 Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 341 (1999).
241 Id.
Oct. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSMTTITONAL LAW_ 
tions. Therefore, at this socio-cultural point in time it is ill-advised to
adopt a subjective approach to determining legal sex because the
pervasive perception that one's birth sex always dictates one's gender
is simply too appealing an argument to ignore, to the peril of trans-
sexuals whose constitutional rights are largely riding on judicial em-
pathy.
For similar reasons, it should be obvious that a judicial approach
that considers only birth sex or chromosomal makeup is far worse
than a liberal policy of self-identification for all transsexuals. Defin-
ing both preoperative and postoperative transsexuals' sex by birth sex
alone is not only grossly unfair to transsexuals, but also ignores the
basic tenet that "sex" is not merely a function of anatomy and biol-
242
ogy. More importantly, this distinction exiles gender to a nether
realm of inconsequentiality, thus condemning even postoperative
transsexuals to imprisonment in a strange sexual body that is abso-
lutely incompatible with their gender. Ultimately, defining legal sex
by birth sex or chromosomal makeup alone does not facilitate the le-
gal goals of objectivity, consistency, and accuracy, but instead under-
mines these objectives. For instance, this policy would mandate that
a postoperative male-to-female transsexual who now has the external
genitalia and secondary sex characteristics of a female would still be
classified as an anatomical male despite the absence of a penis. This
would clearly be an egregious inconsistency, one that would turn a
blind eye to the transsexual's objectively ascertainable female genita-
lia and secondary sex characteristics, and be unforgivably disrespect-
ful of the transsexual's sexual autonomy and her laudable resolve and
courage.
Now that we have cast aside the two most extreme approaches fa-
voring liberal self-identification of sex and determination based solely
on chromosomal makeup or birth sex, we are left with one policy: a
method whereby courts would consider a wide variety of factors, in-
cluding chromosomal makeup, in determining legal sex. There are
obvious advantages and drawbacks to this method. If courts adopt
the multi-factor approach to sex definition, it would ostensibly apply
to preoperative transsexuals as well as postoperative transsexuals, and
would thus be more equitable. However, courts now have little guid-
ance on how much weight to accord each factor in making a deter-
mination of legal sex, and it is very probable that many courts would
allot external factors such as anatomical sex or chromosomal makeup
more weight than internal factors, bringing the approach uncom-
fortably close to the inequitably narrow birth sex/chromosomal
makeup method rejected earlier. This method would also allow
242 See, e.g., Franke, supra note 12; Greenberg, supra note 10.
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courts much discretion in making legal determinations of sex, which
would be an uncomfortable and invasive process for transsexuals at
best, and unjustifiable as a state police power to protect health, wel-
fare, safety, and morals at the worst. Therefore, because this ap-
proach is so unsatisfactory as well, we must dig deeper to uncover a
more appropriate approach.
D. Toward a More Objective Approach to Legal Determination of Sex
We can begin to conceive of another, more objective approach by
examining cases in which judges have sought to apply objective ap-
proaches, albeit in differing contexts. Ironically, Justice Scalia has
articulated unique approaches towards sexual issues in two cases that
have come before the Court in recent years. In the same-sex harass-
ment case Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, advocates the adoption of an objective approach to
determining what constitutes sexual harassment through the adop-
tion of the reasonable person standard.243 In his dissent in Romer v.
Evans, Scalia stated that it was constitutionally within the ability of the
state-wide community to pass legislation preventing homosexuals
from obtaining special treatment. 4T
If we combine Scalia's emphasis on objective criteria in Oncale
with his emphasis on the free will of local communities to legislatively
determine the dominant mores of that community set by usage and
custom, we can begin to articulate the foundations of a solid objective
approach to jurisprudential determinations of sex and sexual iden-
tity. In developing our approach, we must first broaden Scalia's use
of the word "community" so that our objective determinations are not
based upon usage and custom in a given community; such an ap-
proach would undermine the consistency of standard we are striving
for and would burden considerations of equity and fairness as well.
Instead, we must base the objective determination of sex and sexual
identity upon the customs as well as the dynamic and evolutive con-
243 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) ("[Wle have emphasized,
moreover, that the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances."').
244 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). As the dissenting opinion states: "the constitutional
amendment here before us is ... rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to
preserve traditional sexual mores against the effects of a politically powerful minority to revise
those mores through use of the laws." Id. at 636. Scalia further explains that
the people of Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does not
even disfavor homosexuals in any substantive sense, but merely denies them preferential
treatment. Amendment 2 is designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual
morality favored by a majority of Coloradans, and is not only an appropriate means to
that legitimate end, but a means that Americans have employed before.
Id. at 653.
Oct. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
cepts of a larger community of discourse; common law precedent and
statutory indicia of legislative will."45 The nature of the legal institu-
tion itself underscores the appropriateness of this approach.46 Thus
far, the majority of jurisdictions have memorialized the traditional
conception of heterosexual marriage by refusing to allow preopera-
tive transsexuals to self-identify their own sexes. This harmonizes the
chronicle of law with statutory indicia of legislative will, for as previ-
ously discussed, most states allow only postoperative transsexuals to
change their legal sex on their birth certificate and other official
documents. At this point in time, it would be improper to allow pre-
operative transsexuals to self-identify their own legal sex, for "the ju-
2,15 Science is no stranger to the law, either; the scientific community has been sanctioned as
an authority on matters of sex determination since the issue first came before the courts, which
have consistently deferred to psychology and other mental health professions in understanding
transsexualism, and have also deferred to medical science in determining when sex reassign-
ment surgery was "medically necessary" instead of merely "experimenta." See Miller v. Whit-
btrn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 1993) (defining an "experimental" procedure in the medical
profession as "whether the service has come to be generally accepted by the professional medi-
cal community as an effective and proven treatment for the condition for which it is being
used."); Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Stipp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (where evidence supports
sex-reassignment surgery as "medically necessary" for treatment of transsexuals). However, the
same debate between the sublective and objective at issue here is raging in the scientific and
medical commtnities in a different context that should be the subject of another paper.
2i Law is but a museum of texts; its body of discourses reflects and mirrors the practices and
ideologies of the cultures that eddy about and through its pronouncements. Most times law
travels with the slow-paced caravan, not as an express courier of change; "[1]aw may confirm, it
does not initiate." Larry CatA Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Courts, Law,
and the Interpretive Process, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291, 292 (Spring 2000). This is because
"law exists within and reflects the culture from which it operates;" precedent and statutory pro-
visions have not evolved independently of ideology, society, and culture but instead have devel-
oped hand in hand with such forces. Id. Modern justices, then, are "chroniclers of the norms
through which people sharing a common culture understand themselves," and "the primary
function of courts is to identify ctlttral practice and then to memorialize that practice as law."
Id. at 292, 294. Once altered, pronotncements of law limit and define their subjects, eliciting
determinations of what something is or is not. As cultral practice changes, the law becomes a
forum for controversy and confrontation as diverse voices strive to preserve the insights of the
present for posterity, to transform the "what is" into the "what will be." Backer posits that in a
"culturally prophetic sense ... courts exist as the place for the struggles and contestations which
may produce cultural movement." Id. at 294. "To the victor of these struggles belongs a greater
authority to pronounce convincingly those standards/patterns/models of the normal which
may be enforced by the countless disciplines marshaled by society for that purpose." Id. at 295.
Not all confirontation elicits change; often courts act as a kiln that stbjects newly molded prin-
ciples to heated debate, producing a hardened theory of law that holds water. Modern law is
essentially the product of the negotiations of a few. This process of memorialization "stabilizes
the court's message and makes it appear immutable." Id. at 301. However, the solidity of these
legal edifices is misleading; "the fact of memorializing does not make more solid or enduring
that which was memorialized .... [It] cannot slow the process of the production and repro-
duction of culture .... preserves a record of shared norms at the time of their making." Id. at
301-02.
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diciary cannot successfully compel radical change" as the legislature
can. 2 "Change must come first; law follows.
248
Therein lies the best solution to articulating a liberty interest in
self-identification, one that has already been adopted by the repre-
sentatives of the vast majority of states and therefore, because of the
democratic process, conceivably woven into the cultural cloth of
those jurisdictions. If the current statutory policy of postoperative
transsexual self-definition that is currently in place in a majority of
states is extended to all legal determinations of sex, the result would
be a modified policy of self-definition for every legal context in which
only postoperative transsexuals would be permitted to self-define
their legal sex. In other words, only those transsexuals whose gender
was harmonized with anatomical sex and secondary sex characteris-
tics would be legally recognized as members of their self-identified
sex. As will be seen, this approach simultaneously protects the equity
that is owed to transsexuals and safeguards the interests of the law in
consistency, objectivity, and accuracy.
It may at first appear inequitable to allow postoperative transsexu-
als and not preoperative transsexuals to exercise this legal privilege.
However, as sex reassignment surgery is quite obviously the "medi-
cally necessary ' 49 treatment for transsexualism, and is not simply ex-
perimental, one could state that sex reassignment surgery is the final
therapeutic goal for every transsexual. Therefore, like other legal
"disabilities" such as infancy, preoperative transsexualism would be
legally curable, remedied upon the successful completion of sex-
reassignment surgery. Medical personnel and psychologists, not
courts, are best able to tell when a transsexual is ready to live as a
member of the self-identified sex. Currently, medical requirements
already exist which require preoperative transsexuals to complete
several procedures before proceeding with sex reassignment surgery,
including hormone therapy and the completion of a "real-life test," in
which the transsexual lives as a member of the self-identified sex for a
2~,%long period of time, usually at least a year. If a transsexual has not
yet fulfilled the requirements for sex-reassignment surgery, then it is
very likely that those medical authorities most "in the know" would
opine that she is not yet ready to live permanently in her self-
identified sex and therefore should not yet be legally recognized as a
member of that sex.
Of course, this policy is not perfect, and indeed a perfect policy
cannot yet be articulated or implemented, for such a policy would
247 Id. at 298.
248 Id. at 306.
249 See Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
250 See HARRY BENJAMIN, STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 73, at § 4.9.1.
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somehow allow all transsexuals, whether preoperative or postopera-
tive, to self-identify their own legal sex, something which is not possi-
ble in today's social and legal climates. For better or worse, the law is
a product of a majoritarian socio-cultural context in which sex is de-
fined in binary terms of male and female, and even the most liberal
sex expectations decree that those with internal male gender should
have a penis and testes, and those with internal female sex should
have a vagina. In other words, law, like society, defines sex not by
one's internal gender alone but by a combination of anatomical sex
characteristics and internal gender. Biological and anatomical char-
acteristics by their very nature play a pronounced role in such deter-
minations.
Society can only evolve to the point where the focus is on indi-
viduals, and not their anatomy, after the prerequisites for social roles
and statuses such as marriage evolve beyond sex. It will take much
time for such a position to become accepted, and still more for it to
become the law of the land. Until then, it is more productive to util-
ize the system against itself and seek to expand it so that at least post-
operative transsexuals may obtain legal recognition of their new sex;
it would be counter-productive to the interests of transsexuals to deny
all transsexuals the right to live in their self-identified sex. Working
within the system entails, of course, the acceptance of a definition of
sex that considers biological characteristics as well as gender. After
all, the law's "central concern has been to order rights, duties, reme-
dies around the gender of citizens rather than around citizens per
se."251 Currently "[i]t is precisely the organisation [sic] of sex differ-
ences on biological essentialist criteria, and the rigidity of the legal
construction of sex determination and indeed sex designation itself,
which functions to exclude transsexuals. '2 52 However, if we elbow bio-
logical determinations and anatomical characteristics aside to make
ample room for gender at the card table of constitutional rights, then
gender may put its own cards on the table and finally play a role that
is increasingly equal with-and hopefully eventually superior to-that
of anatomical sex. Thus, adopting a policy allowing postoperative
transsexuals to self-define their own legal sex will give us a position
on the cliff-face from which we may agitate for other social and legal
transitions.
In addition, if we accept that gender is a socio-cultural construc-
tion, we must necessarily accept that it is performative, like any other
type of social behavior. If we apply gender as a performative concept
to postoperative transsexuals, we see that these individuals have al-
ready "performed" a full transition from one gender to another, in-
251 EDWARDS, supra note I1, at 12.
252 Id.
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cluding forsaking their birth anatomy in favor of surgically con-
structed external organs. No legal authority should have the power
to deny transsexuals who have undergone this difficult and arduous
process the ability to live in their new sex.
It is extremely significant that this approach is already ostensibly
in place in the many states that allow postoperative transsexuals to
change their legal sex on their birth certificate and other official
documents. The statutory adoption of this policy in one context of
legal sex determination greatly supports its adoption in all contexts of
legal sex determination. Moreover, the current application of this
modified self-definition policy demonstrates that it is acceptable to
the representatives who are elected to speak for the communities in
which it is applied, and therefore by democratic proxy to those citi-
zens who live in those communities. Therefore, by extending this
approach to all legal determinations of sex, a court would not be
usurping legislative power or acting against communal mores as the
will of the people, theoretically represented by state legislatures, has
already adopted the policy in one context. After all, this policy is al-
ready a cultural practice, and is already memorialized in law.
Some may argue that this approach medicalizes instead of legal-
izes definitions of sex, assigning to the medical community determi-
nations that should be within the discretion of the courts. It is easy to
recognize, however, that the medicalization of legal sex determina-
tion is an asset, not a liability. In Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, the Su-
preme Court itself has defined the special role that physicians play in
intimate matters and deferred to physicians and members of the
medical community concerning issues of contraception and abortion.
This entails a legal recognition that medical professionals are experts
in areas where most judges are not. By determining that sex-
reassignment surgery is the key to legal recognition of self-identified
sex, "legal recognition serves to endorse and retrospectively legiti-
mate a medical model with inbuilt notions of gender and sexuality. '5 3
Courts have continued to define transsexualism through medical
constructions and have resorted to medicine in holding that trans-
sexualism was a serious medical need and that sex-reassignment sur-
gery was a medically necessary procedure. Even the law cannot re-
move transsexualism from its medical context and re-embed it in a
social nest in which it would be perceived by the majority of unin-
formed Americans as merely another social ill undeserving of legal
protection.
Others may question the efficacy of sex-reassignment surgery itself
as a viable means of treatment. Deferring to the medical community,
2 Sharpe, supra note 6, at 32.
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numerous courts have recognized that sex-reassignment surgery is
medically necessary and indeed is the only successful treatment for
transsexualism. 2  While there is no question that sex-reassignment
surgery is at best painful and distressing, it currently is the preferred
treatment for transsexualism, and so it cannot be properly termed
mutilation.
This reliance upon a medical model also comports with the na-
ture of transsexualism as primarily affecting sexual identity, not sex-
ual orientation. As Sharpe suggests, "[i]n the context of sexuality,
law presupposes that medicine has already established the hetero-
sexuality (in the psychological sense) of the post-operative transsex-
ual who stands before the court and asks for legal recognition of her
sex claims. ''2  This correctly implies that it is not a heterosexual ori-
entation that defines legal recognition of sex but gender as it is per-
manently and publicly harmonized through sex-reassignment sur-
gery. This emphasis upon gender as the determining factor
illustrates that "heterosexual desire by itself has proved insufficient
for legal recognition. " ' In reality, legal determinations of sex that
rely upon the fulfillment of medically imposed requirements and the
successful completion of medically endorsed surgical procedures in-
herently involve both determinations of heterosexual desire and the
actual capacity to satisfy this heterosexual desire. By using sex-
reassignment surgery as the point upon which a transsexual's self-
identified sex is legally recognized, a court is automatically relying
upon the medical determination that a heterosexual orientation is in
place, for that determination is made by the medical community be-
fore sex-reassignment surgery is performed. While "legal recognition
of transsexual sex claims has proved conditional upon the establish-
ment of heterosexual desire (presumed to be established within the
medical arena) and heterosexual capacity (demonstrated by specific
surgical procedures), ,'' "7 the establishment of heterosexual desire
and capacity has been properly subordinated to questions of gender
that trigger the transsexual diagnosis and are the catalyst of therapy,
from hormones to sex reassignment.
Finally, relying on a medical model also protects the privacy inter-
ests of transsexuals. A transsexual's physician is, by nature of the pa-
25, See Doe v. State Dept. Public Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977) (holding that the to-
tal exclusion of transsexual surgery from eligibility for medical assistance payments was void,
that standard of medical necessity requiring applicant for benefits to prove by conclusive evi-
dence that requested medical treatment will eliminate disability and render applicant self-
supporting was invalid, and that Welfare Department's determination to deny medical assis-
tance benefits to adult male transsexual was arbitrary and unreasonable).
2,55 Sharpe, supra note 6, at 32.
T,' Id.
2.57 Id. at 33.
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tient-client relationship, intimately acquainted with the individual's
anatomy and medical record. It is easier, less embarrassing, and cer-
tainly less personally invasive for a doctor to certify that sex reassign-
ment surgery has been completed and that the transsexual is now
anatomically a member of the opposite sex than for the courts them-
selves to make this determination. A judge could hardly order a
transsexual to disrobe in the middle of a court proceeding to prove
to every curious and unbelieving eye the objective fact of her new sex.
The largest criticism of this policy would most likely be that it en-
dorses same sex marriage, which is forbidden in all states. The his-
torical argument against sex self-identification lies in the secular
definition of marriage itself. Marriage is frequently viewed as "the
keystone in the arch of civilization, , and the Supreme Court itself
has stated that marriage "is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the founda-
tion of the family and of society, without which there would be nei-
ther civilization nor progress. 2 59  Critics of sex self-identification
claim that permitting transsexuals to self-identify their own sex would
allow a male-to-female postoperative transsexual to marry another
male, someone of his own birth sex. This would directly violate the
many legislative statutes that decree marriage to be between male and
female, often for the purposes of procreation. Critics such as
Bennett26° note that it would also be a direct strike at the ancient insti-
tution of marriage itself which lies at the root of our society; if we
blight this root by allowing sexual self-identification, critics claim, the
root will wither and die.
Marriage has long been the legal province of the legislature.261 In
order to understand the criticism that such a self-identification policy
would endorse same-sex marriage, it is necessary to examine Baehr v.
Lewin 262 and the Defense of Marriage Act.263 When Baehr v. Lewin, the
Hawaii same-sex marriage case, was still pending before the Hawaii
Supreme Court, Congress clearly articulated its position on same-sex
marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act passed to "defend the insti-
25 William Bennett,... But Not a Very Good Idea, Either, WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at A19.
V ) Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
214 See Bennett, supra note 258.
261 As Bennett states:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the
morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to
the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract
to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obliga-
tions it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and
the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.
Id. at 205.
2U 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
0 Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. REP. NO. 104-664 (1996).
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tution of traditional heterosexual marriage. ' 2 4 The third section of
the Act defines "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife," and "spouse" as "only a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife."'2& The Act was moti-
vated in part by the Baehr conundrum; if same-sex couples were per-
mitted to legally obtain a marriage license in Hawaii, Congress feared
that other states would be forced to recognize same-sex unions under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Constitution.2 66 Despite the
shadow of Full Faith and Credit, the Judiciary Committee stated its
belief "that a court conscientiously applying the relevant legal princi-
ples would be amply justified in refusinA to give effect to the same-sex
'marriage' license from another State."
It is immediately apparent that adoption of a modified self-
identification policy that would allow postoperative transsexuals to
self-identify their legal sex does not violate the terms of the Defense
of Marriage Act as the DMA applies only to marriages between homo-
sexuals and not to marriages in which one party is a postoperative
transsexual. In legally recognizing postoperative transsexuals as
members of their self-identified sex for the purposes of official
documents, the majority of states have shown that postoperative
transsexuals are legally recognized as members of the self-identified
sex, and by allowing postoperative transsexuals to obtain a new birth
certificate issued with their self-identified sex have given those trans-
sexuals the tools they need to obtain a marriage license. For in-
stance, the issuance of a birth certificate bearing a male-to-female
2C4 Id. at 2. The Judiciary Committee stated that that it did not believe that "passivity is an
appropriate or responsible reaction to the orchestrated legal campaign by homosexual groups
to redefine the institution of marriage through thejudicial process." Id. at 12.
2(k Id. at 30.
266 The Full Faith and Credit Clause states that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given to each
State to the Public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1.
27 Id. at 9. The report further stated: "the effort to redefine 'marriage' to extend to homo-
sexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of mar-
riage," as "from this nexus between marriage and children springs the true source of society's
interest in safeguarding the institution of marriage." Id. at 12-14. Acting to protect heterosex-
ual marriage was of special significance; "[w]ere it not for the possibility of begetting children
inherent in heterosexual unions, society would have no particular interest in encouraging citi-
zens to come together in a committed relationship. But because America, like nearly every
known human society, is concerned about its children, our government has a special obligation
to ensure that we preserve and protect the institution of marriage." Id. at 14. The report con-
cludes by stating that:
[c]ivil laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a collective moral
judgment about human sexuality. This judgment entails both moral disapproval of ho-
mosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality .... It is both inevitable and entirely appropriate
that the law should reflect such moral judgments.
Id. at 15-16.
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postoperative transsexual's self-identified sex publicly announces that
a marriage between such an individual and another male is not a
same-sex marriage because the transsexual is legally female.
E. The Need for Uniformity
A step that is equally as significant as selecting the means by which
legal sex is determined is ensuring that this policy is adopted uni-
formly in all jurisdictions. There currently exists little judicial con-
sensus over how transsexual sex should be determined or what rights• 268
should be awarded on the basis of that determination. As a per-
son's legal sex is fundamental to her very identity, this is both illogical
and inequitable, and potentially inhumane. Only one uniform con-
clusion is currently possible: that "law as a locus of struggle over sexu-
ality can be dynamic, unstable, and unpredictable." 26"
Uniformly adopting one equitable approach to legal determina-
tions of sex is not enough; a uniform set of provisions defining surgi-
cal requirements and application procedures must be adopted as
well. If legislatures and courts ultimately agree to allow postoperative
transsexuals to define their own sex on new official documents and
recognize the "new" sex in granting marriage licenses, then criteria
specifying exactly what surgeries a transsexual must successfully com-
plete in order to be "postoperative" is also needed. Currently, in
those states that require sex reassignment surgery before new or
amended official documents can be issued, it is sometimes unclear
what surgical procedures are needed to satisfy the requirement of
''sex-reassignment surgery. ,270 For instance, in addition to cosmetic
procedures, male-to-female transsexuals may undergo "orchiectomy,
penectomy, vaginoplasty, clitoroplasty, and labiaplasty, each of which
may be considered "sex-reassignment" surgeries.
' '271
As the above cases and statutory standings make clear, some jurisdictions allow postopera-
tive transsexuals to define their own sex in order to attain a new or amended birth certificate or
a obtain a marriage license, and others do not. Some states refuse to recognize a postoperative
transsexual's new anatomical sex altogether, making of the transsexual's body a mockery, con-
demning her to live the rest of her days in a body that should be a source of pride and personal
honor but is instead downgraded to a humiliating prison, a constant reminder of her sexual
deviance.
Sharpe, supra note 6, at 38.
M Weiss, supra note 40, at 177.
271 Id. at 177.
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CONCLUSION: INTERPRETING SEXUALITY
AS A QUESTION OF LAW
This Comment has amply documented the need to "free sexuality
from the constraints of biological and anatomical destiny."272 Science
has long been able to release a transsexual's internal gender from the
confines of a body bearing the secondary sex characteristics and geni-
talia of a sex that is strange to its unwilling bearer. However, courts
still lag behind, reluctantly refusing to uniformly recognize postop-
erative transsexuals as members of their self-identified sex. Yet, in re-
cent cases, "[t]he legal recognition of transsexual sex claims has in-
volved the loosening of 'legal sex' from a specific temporal
moment-birth-and from a strict grounding in biological determi-
nation. ' g The medicalization of transsexualism has directly influ-
enced this loosening, as "[t]he emergence of psychology as an inte-
gral component in the 'legal sex' determinations has created a legal
space for the constitution and consolidation of sex and sexuality
around the subjective feelings and experiences of individuals. ' 74
Perhaps in future years this loosening will continue to the point
where the stigmas surrounding transsexuality will disappear; perhaps
not. But it must be our goal as legal scholars and advocates to work
towards this point. The current social perceptions of transsexualism
as a condition and transsexuals as a population underpin the rather
pessimistic conclusion of this Comment that only an objective statu-
tory approach will set transsexuals on the road to constitutional
equality through modified self-determinations of legal sex. However,
this approach does enable the creation of an ever-widening legal
space, a means by which transsexuals can squeeze a foot into the door
to constitutional rights before it denies them access on sexual identity
grounds. Perhaps the existence of this ever-widening legal space it-
self will thaw social reception of transsexuals so that transsexualism,
like homosexuality, will eventually be received on its own terms
within mainstream discourse. When transsexuals are seen as people
identical to non-transsexuals whose different experiences of sexual
identity has had a profound and unique effect on their lives which
nontranssexuals cannot fully understand but must respect, and when
sex-reassignment surgery is recognized as a procedure that does
change a person's anatomical sex for all purposes-physiological, so-
cial, and legal-then we will have reached an inclusion that seems
rather miraculous now.
V2 Sharpe, supra note 6, at 38.
273 Id. at 39.
274 Id.
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Thus, the seemingly pessimistic cloud that hangs over this Com-
ment's concluding words has a very noteworthy silver lining. Conflict
itself is something to celebrate, for ironically the presence of social
and legal contestation enriches society by calling into question the
categories of sex and sexual identity and the processes by which these
categories are imposed on individuals.25 Conflict forces us to plumb
the depths of these concepts instead of continuing to enact and im-
pose certain roles on individuals again and again in endless cycles of
hegemony. Through conflict, we have consciousness, and perhaps
eventually consensus as well.
275 Robert E. Lane, Patterns of Political Belief in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 86 (J.N.
Knutson ed., 1973). As Lane states, "without social conflicts, there is no change, no tension in
the system, no consciousness of the beliefs in question. The beliefs are just 'there.' The impor-
tant concepts of rationale, diffusion, persuasion, and other means of learning-even ideology
itself-lose their meaning without the presence of conflict." Id.
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